Paul Raymont

Publications

On the Nature of Conscious States:

1. Entry on the Unity of Consciousness (2006) co-authored with Andrew Brook

2. The Representational Base of Consciousness (2006) co-authored with Andrew Brook

On Mental Causation:

1. Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? (2001)

Cited In: Arthur Sullivan, 'On Causal Relevance: a Reply to Raymont', Dialogue 43 (2004): 355-65.

2. Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism (2003)

Cited in: --1) Jaegwon Kim, 'Mental Causation', in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven  Walter (Clarendon Press Oxford, 2009), pp. 29-52. --2) Sven Walter, 'The Epistemological Approach to Mental Causation', Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 273-85.

3. On Causal Relevance: a Reply to Sullivan (2004)

On Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument against Physicalism:

1.  Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument (1995)

Cited in: --1) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary (MIT Press, 2004).  --2) Luca Malatesti, 'Conoscere le esperienze dei colori', Networks 3-4 (2004): 141-63. 

2. The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument (1999)

Cited in: --1) Paul Noordhof, 'Something Like Ability', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 21-40.  --2) Torin Alter, "Know-how, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis', Theoria 67 (2001): 229-39.  --3) Marco Salucci, 'The Envious Frog', in Mind and Causality, ed. A. Peruzzi (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004).  --4) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary (MIT Press, 2004).  --5) Martina Nida-Rumelin, 'Qualia: The Knowledge Argument', in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. --6) Bence Nanay, 'Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, (2009): 699-717.