National Models of Integration in Comparative Migration Studies: A Critical Appraisal

Aryan Karimi & Rima Wilkes
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National Models of Integration in Comparative Migration Studies: A Critical Appraisal

Aryan Karimi
University of British Columbia
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Rima Wilkes
University of British Columbia

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Abstract

There is a relation between nationalism and immigration and integration policies. The national models of integration are used to understand the relation between nationalism and immigration policies in comparative migration policies. According to the three ethnic, civic, and (multi)cultural national models there is a bidirectional causal relation between nationalism and immigration policy. This means that, for instance, ethnic nationalism causes and is caused by restrictive descent-based laws. Yet, over the recent decades, there have been national policy changes that cannot be explained based on the models. We argue that because the national models were developed based on inductive reasoning their analytical scope is not universal and applicable across time and cases. Their overuse might lead to essentialist tendencies that fit the empirical data into the logic of national models. We show that six more possible correlations between nationalism and immigration remain unexamined.

Keywords: national models of integration, immigration and citizenship policy, comparative migration studies, spurious correlation, tautology
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Introduction

There is a relation between nationalism, the narratives that shape our worldviews, and immigration, citizenship, and integration policies (Ozkirimli, 2017). On the one hand, politicians and policymakers invoke this relation to consolidate support for their policies. On October 2nd, 2020, for instance, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled the details of a new anti-separatism bill. The bill identified increasing diversities and rising numbers of (Muslim) immigrants as threatening France’s national republican values. The aim of the bill was to ensure better assimilation of newcomers into the national traditions. The French case is the latest example in the wave hardening concerns about nationalisms and increasing diversities. Many Western countries have seen renewed debates around the need for immigration and integration policies that, when informed by national values, it is argued, will facilitate social cohesion (Mouritsen et al., 2019; Winter & Presivic, 2019; Schinkel, 2017).

On the other hand, understanding the relation between nationalism and immigration policies has been a central focus of the academic scholarly works from across the disciplines. In the face of the rapidly changing immigration policies and concerns about transformations in nationalisms, the main question has been how to understand the relation between nationalism and immigration policies? This question has been addressed by using the national models of integration.

The models are outcomes of a typological approach which presumes a bidirectional causal relation between nationalism and immigration policy. The typology contains three ethnic, civic, and (multi)cultural national models. According to the models, there is a direct causal link between ethnic nationalism and restrictive immigration policy, civic nationalism and civic immigration policy, and (multi)cultural nationalism and multicultural liberal immigration policy. These national models, particularly in the policy-oriented comparative migration studies (Favell, 2019; Bertossi, Duyvendak & Scholten, 2015), “aim to describe [the] overall differences in how nation-states approach immigrant integration” (Jensen, 2019, p. 615; Borevi, Jensen & Mouritsen, 2017).

For instance, in Germany nation is defined based on ethnicity, ancestry, and common culture. Germany, in turn, falls into the category of ethnic nationalism with policies that limit access to territory and citizenship based on German descent. In France, the nation is understood as a political entity based on civic values. France, in turn, falls into the category of civic nationalism with policies that allow access to territory and citizenship based on descent and so long as the individuals respect the national civic values. Canada defines nation based on multicultural ideologies and values. Canada, in turn, falls into the category of (multi)cultural with policies that allow access to territory and citizenship through descent and so long as groups respect the groups’ cultural rights and values.

Since the conception of the national models in the 1990s, there have been changes in national policies that cannot be explained based on the models. For instance, the ethnic model, cannot explain why and how Germany has extended access to citizenship to second-generation immigrants born in Germany. The (multi)cultural model, cannot explain why in 2014 Canada introduced a Bill to implement a set of restrictive immigration policies which are expected from an ethnic nationalism. The models cannot account for policy change and the apparent mismatch with their respective nationalism (Larin, 2020; Jensen, 2019; Jensen & Mouritsen, 2019; Mouritsen et al., 2019; These models are best known as the national models of integration. However, their analytical use originates from the studies of nationalism and citizenship and was later expanded to integration and immigration policies. These are interrelated policy domains. In this paper, we use “immigration policies” to refer to the broadest sets of policies addressing immigration, citizenship, and integration.

We distinguish our understanding of the national models from that of Alba, Rietz, and Simon (2012). These scholars use the terminology of “models of incorporation” not to address the relation between nationalism and immigration policies but to discuss the various forms of assimilation theory.
al., 2019; Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012; Bertossi, 2011; Joppke, 2007; Favell, 2003). Are such policy changes indicative of changes in the nature of nationalisms?

We argue that the national models, in their current form, cannot address the relation between nationalism and immigration policy. First, we demonstrate that the national models were developed based on a combination of the literature on ethnic-civic nationalisms and the historical-comparative literature on citizenship and immigration policies. Here, we engage with the founding works of Kohn (1967 [1944]), Brubaker (1992), and Favell (1998). These works, albeit based on a limited number of case studies, generated a surge of attention that consolidated the national-model way of thinking as the lingua franca of the comparative migration studies research on nationalism and immigration policy.

However, these founding texts did not delimiting the concepts and the effect or the dependent variables a priori. On other words, they did not define nationalism and immigration policies independent of one another, nor did they deduce these definitions from sociological theories. Instead, these works presumed and retroactively established a correlation between nationalism and their corresponding immigration policies (Favell, 1998, p. 16, p. 245; Brubaker, 1992, p. 13). Subsequently, in the national models that take up these correlations, the concepts and their effects, or nationalism and their alleged policy effects, are not separated in the scientific tradition of building models and theories (Jensen, 2019; Portes, 1998; Calhoun, 1995).

Second, based on our reading of these works, we demonstrate that the national models’ presumption of a causal link between nationalism and immigration policy is fallacious. A close examination reveals that the relation between nationalism and immigration policy is a spurious correlation. Such correlation occurs when there is no direct causal link between an independent variable and the effect due to the impact of a mediating factor (Mills & Tropf, 2020; Goldthorpe, 2001; Kiser & Hetcher, 1991; Riley, 1987). Since the national models were developed based on non-randomly selected empirical cases, and due to the spurious correlation between nationalism and immigration policy of these cases, the analytical value of the national models is limited to the case studies (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005; Shapin, 1992)\(^3\).

Yet, the national models have been used as if they are ideal-type models that establish causal links between concepts and effects, and as if they are applicable in comparative research across time and contexts (Bertossi, Duyvendak & Scholten, 2015). This has resulted in tautological arguments that essentialize empirical data. Tautology is a conditional statement in which the hypothesis implies and entails the conclusion (Kaplan, 2017 [1964]). For instance, according to the national models, the argument is that a civic nationalism causes civic policies and vice versa, and if the nationalism is not civic, it does not cause civic policies (see Portes, 1998). Consequently, it is impossible to observe policy changes in Germany without instantly inferring that the German nationalism is also changing. Nor is it possible to account for policy-related empirical findings that do not correspond to the logic of the national models. Because of the essentialist tendencies, the national models have never been tested against the possibility of other forms of correlations between nationalism and immigration policy. We show that in addition to the three relations represented in the ethnic, civic, and (multi)cultural national models, there are six missing relations between nationalism and immigration policies including, for instance, (multi)cultural nationalism and restrictive policies or civic nationalism and multicultural policies\(^4\).

In what follows, we will first, review the works of Kohn, Brubaker, and Favell to establish

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\(^3\) A similar debate around the validity of typologies and models is also endemic to the research in comparative institutional analyses on welfare states (see Manow, Palier & Schwander, 2018; Manow, 2009; Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1990).

\(^4\) Overall, our critique addresses methodological and theoretical aspects of constructing and using these specific national models. Another critique, beyond the scope of this paper, could address the national models’ relation to the (post)colonial traditions of nationalism and migration control (Schinkle, 2018; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017; Chatterjee, 1991).
their connection to the national models. Second, we will discuss the problem of using the national models to understand recent policy changes. Third, we expand on our critique of the national models: 1- Because the national models are based on inductive reasoning and spurious correlations, their analytical value is not straightforwardly generalizable to other cases; 2 - the (multi)cultural model, in particular, remains a normative model rather than an analytical one; 3 - the inherent tautology and essentialist tendency of the national models misses six more possible correlations between nationalism and immigration. In conclusion, we make recommendation as to how improve the research on the relation between nationalism and immigration policy.

Constructing the National Models

1- Ethnic-civic nationalism

The national models, the ethnic and civic model in particular, are based on Kohn’s typology of nationalisms (Kohn, 1967 [1944]). Kohn developed a dichotomy of non-Western and authoritarian ethnic nationalisms vis-à-vis Western rational civic nationalisms. The goal was not to understand the mechanisms of creating and sustaining nationalisms but to unearth the nature of nationalisms. Indeed, Kohn (1967 [1944]) starts his book on origins of nationalism with a chapter titled “the nature of nationalism”. Kohn equates nationalism with nationality. Accordingly, nationalism and nationality are interchangeable or at least reflective of one another.

The typology divided nations and their nationalisms based on their socio-economic development and cultural diversities. Kohn (1967 [1944]), goes as far back to examine the idea of nationalism among the ancient Jews, the Greek polities (chapter II), and the Roman Empire (chapter III). He examines the role of religious fervour and ethnic tribalism in shaping the understandings of nationhood among the first two cases. In contrast, he examines the Roman Empire’s adoption of a belief in “universal imperial idea” based “upon peace and justice” to define nationhood.

Kohn (1967 [1944]) argues that the modern nation-states inherit these traditions, one based on tribalism and ethnicity, and the other based on universalism. Germany, for instance, inherits the ethnic traditions. German humanist and literary scholars uncritically adopt a glorified narrative of their tribal past to portray themselves as ancient, independent and superior to other nations. This narrative defines citizenship through the concept of folk, or peoplehood (chapter VII). In contrast, he argues, England and France see the emergence of strong centralized states which outgrow but also systematize the old vague boundaries of nationalism. In these countries, the elite and the state elevate the concepts of liberty and equality to define citizenship as a universal territorial right (chapter IV). Although disputed, Kohn argues that these states, as colonial powers, “set the pace for tolerance and respect for human personality where they had been unknown before” in their colonies (chapter VIII).
Accordingly, Kohn divides nations and nationalisms into two fixed ethnic and civic categories. The basic argument put forward is that nationalism is a state of mind that has expressed itself in two main ways to date (1967 [1944], p. 11). In some nations, nationalism expresses itself through ethnic folklore. Here, ethnic group precedes and leads to the creation of nation-state in the form of ethnic nationalism. These countries are often less economically developed compared to the countries in the civic category. Ethnic nationalism corresponds to ethnic nationality based on ethnic descent and blood. In some other nations, nationalism expresses itself through political values and economic developments (1967 [1944], p. 4). Here, state’s political power unites different groups under a nation-state and in the form of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism corresponds to civic nationality based on shared political values and territorial residence.

**Figure 3** Kohn’s typology of nationalisms

| Ethnic nationalism | Civic nationalism |

### 2- Nationalism and citizenship

Brubaker’s (1992) comparative study of nationalism and citizenship in Germany and France shifted the focus from ethnic-civic typology of nationalism to understanding how these ethnic or civic traditions uphold citizenship laws. Brubaker (1992, p. ix), like Kohn, starts his work based on the assumption that, according to Aristotle, the nature of citizenship reflects the traditions of nationhood.

In the first step, Brubaker points to two diverging sets of terminologies and policies of immigration and citizenship. One set of these laws are restrictive and are best reflected in *jus sanguinis* rights, or the right to citizenship by blood. These laws limit access to national belonging to descendants of the core or original ethnic group. At the time of Kohn’s study (1967 [1944]), and later on at the time of Brubaker’s study (1992), such restrictive laws were prevalent in Germany, Israel, and Greece among others. Another set of these citizenship laws are more liberal and are best reflected in *jus soli* rights, or the right to citizenship because of birth in the territory of a nation-state. These laws are more inclusive in bestowing access to national belonging to all residents of the country so long as they all adhere to the same civic values.

In the second step, Brubaker uses inference to determine the nature of nationalism from the citizenship laws (see Shulman, 2002, p. 560 on the problem of inferring nationalism from state policies). The countries with *jus sanguinis* laws were put into the category of ethnic nationalism. These countries, it is argued, emphasize common descent to define nationhood. The countries with *jus soli* laws were assigned to the category of civic nationalism. These countries, it is believed, emphasize the shared civic values such as liberty and equality to define nationhood.

**Figure 4** citizenship as rooted in nationalism

| Nationalism | citizenship policy |

The third step was to work retroactively through historical evidences to show how distinctive understandings of nationhood have shaped different sets of immigration and citizenship policies (Brubaker, 1992). Here, he examines the role of demography, emigration and immigration, state-formation, and several waves of regional conflicts as well as the French
revolution in establishing the two contrasting forms of nationalisms and citizenship policies in Germany and France.

3- Nationalism and immigration-citizenship policy

Favell’s (1998) work on philosophies of integration in the UK and France further shaped the comparative research informed by typological understandings of nations and citizenship laws. Through Favell’s work, the focus is broadened to include the citizenship as well as immigration and integration policies. Not unlike in Kohn’s and Brubaker’s works, the assumption is that citizenship reflects the ideals of “unifying values, cohesion, and identity” (p.1) in modern nation-states. He presumes a “direct normative connection between the nature of a liberal political system and the epistemological effectiveness of its outcome” (p. 28).

Favell (1998) argues that with the increasing immigration numbers, it is important to understand how various countries implement a series of political responses to “deal with political, social, and moral dilemmas posed by the integration of various ethnic and racial groups” (p. 2). Different countries use different policies such as intégration in France and race-relations in the UK to construct and implement immigration policies.

According to Favell (1998), immigration policies are informed by “public philosophies”. These philosophies represent national understandings of autonomy, citizenship, nationality, and equality. These philosophies are informed by consensual “normative and explanatory” ideas and assumptions (p. 2). The philosophies, and their consequent immigration policies, respond to the Hobbesian question on how the state achieves and sustains communal national stability. The philosophies are forward-looking in developing policies that address national integration (p. 21). The concept of public philosophies resembles the definitions of nationalism. Both concepts provide an explanation for the processes of nation-state formation and nation-building.

Favell’s (1998) work, then, emphasizes the importance of the institutionalized policies over time and their impact on the public philosophies. Akin to nationalism, public philosophies, over time, produce policies that are complementary to one another. These policies, added layer by layer, create a mass of guidelines that monopolize and shape the future policies. In other words, these policies become institutionalized. This institutionalization means that it is hard if not impossible to change the course of these and upcoming policies. The institutionalization of immigration policies guarantees their perpetuation and, by default, the preservation of the public philosophies. Based on these tools and theories, as Favell argues, it is possible to see how philosophies and immigration policies are “modelled” (p. 21).

Figure 5 - institutionalization and impact of immigration policies

| Nationalism | ← | immigration policy |

4- Multicultural nationalism and policy

Simultaneous to the development of the ethnic-civic nationalisms and their relations to immigration policies, political philosophers argued that the ethnic and civic nationalisms collapse far too many characteristics and components of nationalisms into the ethnic and civic categories (Shulman, 2002; Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995). The pioneers of multiculturalism, as a national ideology and a state policy, underline the importance of culture, as independent of ethnicity or civic politics, in shaping nationalism and determining who belongs and who does not belong to the nation (Shulman, 2002, p. 559; Tamir, 2019; Kymlicka, 2001).
Figure 6 - immigration policies at the time

| Restrictive policy | Civic policy | Multicultural policy |

The multicultural model is superior, it is argued, because of its flexibility vis-à-vis the ethnic-civic national models’ understanding of immigration policies. For instance, with regards to newcomer integration, it is impossible to surpass ethnic nationalisms’ *jus sanguinis* requirements. Also, on the other hand, civic policies ultimately require the forced incorporation and assimilation of minorities into the majority’s culture. Multicultural nationalism and multicultural immigration policies prevent the predominance of one ethnicity or culture-religion over others.

Figure 7 - overall forms of nationalisms deduced from policies

| Ethnic nationalism | Civic nationalism | Multicultural nationalism |

From this point on, by the end of the 1990s, the combination of the above scholarly works takes a leap of faith in the form of national models of integration. These works are combined and extended into national models to analyze the relation between nationalisms, or public philosophies in Favell’s terms, and immigration policies across time and contexts. While neither of these scholars made claims to developing ideal-type models for understanding nationalism and immigration policy, the national models emerge and become a common starting point for comparative migration studies (Bertossi, Duyvendak & Scholten, 2015).

The recent literatures on comparative migration, citizenship, and nationalism studies use the terms nationalism as synonymous with immigration policies. There is an unexamined and implicit acceptance of the presence of a bidirectional causal relation between nationalism and immigration policy. According to the national models, ethnic nationalism causes and is caused by restrictive descent-based laws. Civic nationalism is caused by and causes various forms of civic policies. And, multicultural nationalism is caused by and begets liberal multicultural immigration policies.

Figure 8 - ethnic model

| Ethnic nationalism (ethnic ancestry) | Restrictive immigration and citizenship policies |

Figure 9 - Civic model

| Civic nationalism (territory, rights) | Civic immigration and citizenship policies |

Figure 10 - (multi)cultural model

| (multi)Cultural nationalism (culture, religion) | Liberal immigration and citizenship policies |
Problem

The literature using the national models as analytical tools amounts to a wealth of scholarly work. The national models are frequently used to compare countries and examine their socio-cultural and institutional responses to newcomer incorporation (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2008). Yet, the national models remain conceptually vague and lack clear categorical and empirical boundaries. For instance, Bertossi, Duyvendak, and Scholten’s (2015, p. 70) review of the use of national models in France and the Netherlands shows that French policymakers’ emphasis on achieving equality opportunity through immigration policies could “easily fit with the programme described as ‘multiculturalism’ by many scholars”. Similarly, to assess the socio-political backlash against multiculturalism, several studies lumped together countries that had previously been assigned to ethnic or civic categories, including Germany, Greece, the UK, Japan, and France, to argue against the backlash and for the persistence of multiculturalism (e.g., Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; see Bloemraad & Wright, 2014 for a more nuanced study; see Vertovec & Wissendorf, 2010 on definitions of multiculturalism).

These group of studies decouple immigration policies from nationalism and focus on the convergence and divergence of the former (Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2012; Joppke, 2007). According to the bidirectional causal logic of the national models, however, the policy convergences around multiculturalism indicate, read: cause, transformation of all nationalisms into multicultural nationalisms. Are all countries becoming multicultural and, consequently, the ethnic-civic nationalisms becoming irrelevant? A fundamental change in nationalisms towards multiculturalism, particularly during the short period of time since the rise of multiculturalism in 1970s, is unlikely. There is a consensus in the nationalism studies that the core national values are unlikely to change easily even as a result of international policies, war, and mass exodus of populations (Coakley, 2018; see in particular Ozkirimli, 2017).

A second group of scholars who bring nationalism back into the equation argue that the conventional forms of nationalism still inform everyday life and policymaking in different countries despite the rise and fall of multiculturalism (Jensen, 2019; Jensen & Mouritsen, 2019; Mouritsen et al., 2019). The main argument is that the individual citizens of each country are aware of their national norms and laws and can separate the national borders from one another even when little policy difference there seems to exist between the countries. But, the causal logical of the national models does not allow for a mismatch between immigration policy and nationalism. Can countries with ethnic nationalism implement multicultural immigration policies while retaining their ethnic nationalism? The following examples further reveal the analytical limits of the national models.

Canada introduced the Bill C-24 to implement a set of restrictive immigration policies. The Bill decreased the numbers of new immigrants coming to Canada and increased the residency years and language skills requirements for citizenship eligibility. The bill created a list of safe countries to, basically, render asylum claims from the citizens of these countries as inadmissible. Most troubling, the Bill included a clause on citizenship revocation without due process at the discretion of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Two years later the Bill was abolished under a new Liberal government. How can multicultural nationalism’s effect on immigration policies explain the implementation of the Bill C-24? Was the Bill a sing of “re-ethnici”zation” (Joppke, 2003) of immigration policies and, in turn, emergence of ethnic nationalism in Canada (Winter & Previsic, 2019)?

Germany introduced a new German Citizenship Act in the year 2000 and amended it in 2008. The Act, for the first time, allowed the second-generation immigrants to access German citizenship. The Act, thus, complemented the jus sanguinis tradition of citizenship by adding a jus soli option. Since Germany did not recognize dual citizenship, at the age 18-23 the second-generation immigrants had to choose between keeping their German citizenship or that of their jus sanguinis, if they held any such citizenship. Surprisingly, the Act was further amended in 2014 to allow for dual citizenship for the second-generations who hold a second European citizenship.
How can the ethnic model explain the implementation of this Act? Is the Act a sign of liberalization or “de-ethnicization” (Joppke, 2003) of immigration policies and, in turn, emergence of civic or even multicultural nationalism in Germany (Joppke, 2017)?

In the following sections we show that the assumption that there is a bidirectional causal relation between nationalism and immigration and citizenship policies was never theorized. Nor was this assumption tested against counterfactual cases. Instead, the models produce historicist descriptions since they analyze “historical action in historical actors’ terms” (Shapin, 1992, p. 354). As a result, we cannot use the models to accurately examine policy changes and their relation to nationalism. The analytical value of the models, or more accurately the analytical insight based on the empirical case studies of the founding texts discussed above, is limited to the epoch and national contexts of those case studies (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005).

Critique

1- Ideal-type models or spurious correlations?

Kohn (1967 [1944]) developed his definitions of ethnic and civic nationalisms through an inductive analysis ridden with ideological values as well as sampling error and bias. Based on his observation of the disparate citizenship traditions in a limited number of non-random cases, he created a typology that a posteriori classified these cases into the ethnic-civic categories. The function of such inductive real-type typologies is to condense the complex social patterns of the cases under investigation into categories with more commonalities and, ideally, fewer differences (Ebbinghaus, 2012). The major problem, however, is that neither Kohn, nor the works building on his typology, separated the concepts from their effects. The conceptual definitions of variables, i.e., nationalism and policy, remain murky if not overlapping (see Larin, 2020; Jensen, 2019).

Figure 11 - main model updated

Inductive typologies are different from deductive typologies. The latter is constructed a priori closely related but not as a copy of real-world observation. These deductive typologies define theoretical concepts and causal relations that can be used as ideal-types across time and contexts (Kiser & Hechter, 1991). These ideal-types produce hypotheses for empirical investigation of the observable world, the real-types. Thus, inductive models are the systematic clustering of empirical cases into categories while deductive models provide theoretically-deduced benchmarks for empirical examinations.

Inductive typologies are limited to the cases under study and their corresponding context and timeline. Any further case and its place within the typology must be examined according to the same criteria that were initially used to develop the typology. However, somewhere along the way, since the late 1990s, Kohn’s inductive typology of nationalism was expanded and gave rise to the national models that supposedly reflect universal true statements across national contexts (Shulman, 2002). Today, the comparative migration study literature uses these models as if they were ideal-types. Scholars take the national models as their starting point to compare and contrast the empirical cases without having first established if these cases empirically really belong to the assumed ethnic, civic, or cultural categories (see Kiser & Hetcher, 1991, p. 6).

The typology of nationalism was developed through inductive reasoning to offer some particular conclusions about the status of nationalisms in, for instance Germany and France (Brubaker, 1992) or Israel, France, Germany, and Britain (Kohn, 1967 [1944]). These case-
specific conclusions are valid but not generalizable without further systematic examinations. “Retroactive explanations can only be tentative” because, particularly in comparative historical studies, we cannot “rule out [all] other potential causes and because these explanations remain untested in cases other than those considered” (Portes, 1998, p. 20). Yet, as a result of conflating deductive and inductive arguments, the particularities of nationalisms found in, for instance, Germany and France were generalized into national models. This generalization was already present in Kohn’s work (1967 [1944]) where he observes the “nature” of a few nationalisms but generalizes his findings into the ethnic-civic categories as a universal typology.

A belief in the fundamental difference between the West and the East has informed this generalization (Shulman, 2002). This typology, despite its contextual historical analysis, is “imbued with value-judgments” (Smith, 2008, p. 319) that impair analytical examinations of nationalism and immigration policies. Tamir (2019) also points out that the national models are more normative than theoretical and descriptive. Civic nationalisms represent a rationalized and modern form of national belonging compared to ethnic nationalisms’ irrational and primitive forms of national attachment. These differences then contribute to a blanket categorization of nations in terms of moral and political developments. It is thus important to remember that Kohn’s real-type inductive approach has informed our current use of the national models.

Built on this background, Brubaker (1992) emphasizes the role of nationalism in sustaining citizenship policies, and Favell (1998) underlines the ways these policies are institutionalized to, in turn, steer future policies. Neither of these scholars, however, understands their analyses in terms of ideal-types. They do not establish or test for a direct causal relation between nationalism and immigration policies. Instead, they examine the impact of external factors on, respectively, nationalisms and policymaking to demonstrate the correlation between nationalism and immigration policies. In other words, the correlation is sustained by examining the mediating impact of third factor(s).

Table 1 - external factors used in support of the relation between nationalisms and policies (adapted from Shulman, 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Types of nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic ancestry</td>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>(multi)cultural nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will and consent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political institutions-parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brubaker demonstrates how “differing definitions of citizenship have been shaped and sustained by distinctive and deeply rooted understandings of nationhood” (1992, p. x). In doing so, he examines how national consciousness was developed quite differently in Germany and France. The former found itself in a conflict between the institutional powers of the Roman Empire and Prussian state and the nationhood sentiments of the Germanic people. In the latter, the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and the national sentiments were fused under monarchical rule as a political fact.

Over time, the definition of belonging takes on an ethno-cultural tone in Germany. In France, since the French Revolution, belonging becomes a political conception. During the 19th
and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the question of ethnic unity with the fatherland, particularly the integration of the returning ethnic German emigrants and a differentalist approach to non-German immigrants shaped political discourse on modern citizenship in Germany. At the same time, in France, the education system, “demographic stagnation, geopolitical realignment, and emerging mass armies” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 103), or the material aspects of nationhood, culminated in assimilationist forces that expanded the political-national boundaries of belonging to immigrants.

Because of the impact of such disparate factors and diverging considerations for strengthening the nationhood, each country settled for different citizenship laws. These considerations are temporally limited. Indeed, both nations had oscillated between \textit{jus sanguinis} and \textit{jus soli}, or restrictive and more universal laws of citizenship over the course of 19\textsuperscript{th} century. For instance, in France, the \textit{jus soli} laws were universally implemented, to complement its German-like \textit{jus sanguinis} laws, only in 1899. This is not surprising since nations, in the long term and in response to socio-political factors, go back and forth between implementing different immigration policies (Larsen, 2017).

\textbf{Figure 12 - the impact of mediating factors on nationalism and immigration policies in Brubaker's discussions}

\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node[draw] (1) {Nationalism};
\node[draw, right of=1, xshift=2cm] (2) {external factor(s)};
\node[draw, right of=2, xshift=2cm] (3) {Immigration policy};
\path[->] (1) edge node {} (2);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

Favell’s (1998) work is critical of locating policies as rooted in nationalism. He avoids essentializing all policies as components of “historical cultural idioms” (1998, p. 44) of the respective countries. He expands the focus of his analyses from citizenship to immigration and integration polices and in doing so he emphasizes the impact of both international and national contexts in shaping national immigration policies (1998, p. 242)\textsuperscript{5}.

Favell (ibid) argues that the institutionalization of the earlier policies creates a path-dependency which guides future policy options but simultaneously allows for policymakers and the elite to practice their agency in selecting from among their available policy options (see also Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2012). Consequently, he examines the role of the heads of the states, political parties, educational and judiciary institutions, and the cultural elite as well as the media in steering the course of immigration policies.

\textbf{Figure 13 - the impact mediating factors on immigration policies and nationalism in Favell's discussions}

\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node[draw] (1) {Nationalism};
\node[draw, right of=1, xshift=2cm] (2) {external factor(s)};
\node[draw, right of=2, xshift=2cm] (3) {Immigration policy};
\path[<->] (1) edge node {} (2);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

Similar to Brubaker (1992), Favell does not establish a deterministic causal relation between policies and nationalism, or, in his terms, the public philosophies. Instead, he argues that the institutionalized policies sustain these public philosophies as a corollary outcome. Policies invoke cultural idioms to garner the public’s identification and support. Policies build public

\textsuperscript{5} We also agree with Favell’s (2019) recent critique that an uncritical adoption of methodological-nationalism risks overlooking the role of international factors that mediate the relations between nationalism and immigration policies. Indeed, nationalisms and immigration policies are shaped through “local and regional processes” but are not “coordinated or causally produced by global social forces” (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010: 787). Instead, the increase in the numbers of immigrants and the rise in demographic diversities are but only one aspect of the processes that involve nationalism as a reference point for identification and policymaking (Traindafyllidou 2017; see also Hollified 2004).
consensus at each point in time but this consensus and the support for the policy framework entails “sustaining the architecture on which it was built” (1998, p. 247). This architecture includes the earlier founding policies and the national values and traditions.

In sum, none of the above studies establish a deterministic causal relation between nationalism and immigration policies. The national models do not lay out a consistent “logically integrated causal explanation” (Calhoun, 1995, p. 5). They presume the existence of a correlation between the two. They make use of mediating factors such as political parties or the impact of shrinking demography and military power to demonstrate the correlation between national goals and immigration policy outcomes.

The national models’ assumption of a bidirectional causal correlation between nationalism and immigration policy is based on spurious correlations. In such correlations, there is no causal relation between the dependent and independent variable. This is because an external factor(s) impacts and regulates the relation between the two elements (Mills & Tropf, 2020; Kiser & Hetcher, 1991). The problem of spurious correlation arises when we discover that either there is no direct causal link between the dependent and independent variables, or “when a variable that is the apparent cause of some effect is revealed later to be the product of some temporally prior variable” (Kiser & Hetcher, 1991, p. 4). Matilda Riley (1987), in her presidential address to the 81st annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, argues that spurious correlations are now commonplace in various fields of social sciences. She clarifies her point by identifying several sources of misinterpretation in research on sociology of age. We quote her at length to emphasize the scale of this analytical issue:

The most common error (generically recognized yet often committed) was to interpret age differences in cross-sectional studies as if they were caused by the process of aging. As an obvious example, the fact that, in cross section, old people had less education than young people would certainly not lead one to infer that a person’s educational level declined because of aging. Surprisingly, many such “life-course fallacies” persist even today, as when medical textbooks continue to use cross-section data to demonstrate putatively inevitable physiological deterioration with aging. Such fallacies persist even where age is known to be a spurious factor- with the correlation traceable instead to age- associated diseases or events, or to cohort differences in life-course experiences. When these fallacious assumptions of universal decline due to growing old are accepted unthinkingly in the sociological as well as the popular literature, they create stereotypes that operate destructively as self-fulfilling prophecies. (Riley, 1987, p. 4)

Whenever the national models are used, there is an implicit acceptance of causal relation between nationalism and immigration policy. We do not, however, need to await a future confirmation or rebuttal of this relation. This is because the causal relation was not established or claimed in the first place in the works of Kohn, Brubkaer, Favell or any other research work in the field. The national models, and the assumption of causalities, are misreading and misinterpretation of the earlier studies on nationalism and immigration policies. Yet, the acceptance of the national models’ causal relations is so entrenched in academic research that nationalism is taken as interchangeable and equivalent with immigration policy.

2-(multi)cultural model: normative or analytical?

Perhaps, at the first look, the (multi)cultural national model comes closest to providing a theorization of what a multicultural nationalism should entail in terms of the links between nationalism and citizenship policies, newcomer integration programs, and majority-minority rights and duties (Kymlicka, 2015; 2011; 1995; Modood, 2007; Miller, 1995; Taylor, 1994). However,
the theories of multiculturalism do not strive to develop any hypotheses on causal relations and the mechanisms behind such relations so to build ideal-type models that can be used in comparative studies (Kiser & Hetcher, 1991). Rather, these theories provide normative philosophies or, in other words, prescriptions for what multicultural nationalism and institutions should look like.

To date, based on such speculations, scholars have offered two main solutions for how we should think about multicultural nationalism and multicultural liberal immigration policies. First, one set of solutions follow a dialectical logic. The underlying thread is that all groups, majorities and minorities, should engage in two-way relationships to adapt to each other but also to preserve some aspects of their cultural identities (Modood, 2019; see Levey, 2019 for an overview of the various forms of multiculturalism). Multicultural nationalism and immigration policies affirm the civic nationalism’s respect for individual rights but go further to add respect for group rights as yet another component (Modood, 2019).

Second, a less challenging solution to striking a balance between nationalism as a conservative force and the more liberal immigration policies has been framed through the ethics of support and deservingness. This approach designates majority groups as determinants of who belongs to the nation. Majorities are expected to use their perceptions of the deservingness to preserve or to expand the boundaries of belonging (Banting et al., 2020; Nagel & Ehrkamp, 2016; see Holmes & Castaneda, 2016 for a critique of such rhetoric). Accordingly, the possibilities of re-constructing the nation and implementing liberal policies are bound to majorities’ “perceptions of the deservingness of members of out-groups such as immigrants” (Banting et al., 2020, p. 206).

Despite presented as an attempt to move beyond the majoritarian ethnic and civic nationalisms, this logic is implicitly but directly informed by the ethnic understanding of nationalism.

The (multi)cultural national model suffers from two main analytical limitations. First, the multicultural model leans more towards the civic model and the importance of shared values. The model presumes that all nationalisms are modern constructs and that ethnicity-based interpretations of national belonging are now defunct or not as effective (Tamir, 2019; Coakley, 2018; Brubaker, 2009). The model presumes static group identities and boundaries and speculates the impact of liberal policies on these identities as if these are disconnected from (trans)national demographic and cultural flows (Zapata-Barrero, 2019; Waters & Jimenez, 2005). Yet, empirical research from across the disciplines has underlined that the attempts to implement liberal policies encounter complications, if not backlash and return to nativism (Zapato-Barrero, 2017a; Schinkel, 2017; Duyvendak, Geschiere & Tonkens, 2016).

This challenge is visible in a variety forms and processes including policymaking debates, institutional legacies, and individuals’ subjective and daily experiences of national belonging (Simonsen & Bonikowski, 2020; Mouritsen et al., 2019; Simonsen, 2018; Bloemraad & Sheares, 2017). Antonsich and Petrillo (2019), for instance, analyze the Italian parliamentary debates on immigration and integration policies. They show the gap between the liberal policies’ inclusive rhetoric vis-à-vis the stability of national legal frameworks that limit the reframing or opening up of national narratives. They underline the divergence between liberal ideological stance of the elite and the reality of nationalistic governance. In another study, Thym (2020) examines the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union on national legislations. He highlights that an ethnicity-based understanding of belonging might have waned but not replaced by inclusive rights-based citizenship policies in Europe. A communitarian and re-culturalized narrative of European membership is now on the rise (Thym, 2020). The resistance towards multicultural policies and the re-culturalization of belonging is not anticipated, nor is it explained by the (multi)cultural model.

The second analytical limit of the (multi)cultural model concerns the co-existence of ethnic and civic elements in nationalisms and the probability of the emergence of immigration policies that challenge these nationalisms. This challenge is best frames as the liberal paradox (Hollified, 2004), i.e., the tensions between the pro-immigration markets and the nationalistic domestic
A. Karimi & R. Wilkes

The (multi)cultural model’s response to the liberal paradox comes in different shapes none of which delineates on causal relations and mechanisms for addressing the paradox. Levey (2012) rightly argues that some multiculturalism theorists ignore nationalism as a far-reaching element (Phillips, 2007), some downplay its role (Modood, 2007), and some push the ethnic and civic aspects of nationalisms to the background and celebrate multicultural ideology and policies (Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995). This is because “nationhood works best when it is deep in the background, as a taken-for-granted presupposition of social life, such that it can indeed be ‘invisible’” (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 12). These scholars exclude and include nationalism in the same breath in their formulations of diversity-accommodating policies. For instance, while pushing the nation to the background, Kymlicka (2015, p. 2) embraces methodological-nationalism to argue that “nationhood can also serve as an effective battery for many social justice claims”.

3-Tautology and essentialism

The presumption of causation where there only exists a spurious correlation necessitates examining and ruling out the impact of an ever-increasing set of factors on the correlation. The causation would then seem more plausible and justifiable as it survives a series of elaborations (Bernert, 1983). This process inevitably leads to tautological analyses, to “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Riley, 1987) and “self-justificatory discourse” (Favell, 2003).

Tautology is a conditional statement in which the hypothesis implies and entails the conclusion. A tautological statement is a logical truth where the subject of the proposition implies the predicate term (Kaplan, 2017 [1964]). As mentioned above, since the two terms, or the concepts and effects, are defined in relation to one another, the effect cannot be empirically tested and invalidated. Because the definitions of concepts and effects are overlapping, we cannot build a hypothesis based on the national models to observe the correlation between nationalism and immigration policy and vice versa (Meyers, 2000).

A tautological statement leads to methodologies that seek to essentialize and fit the empirical data to the hypothesis. Often based on inductive methods, the investigator considers all observable cases and either explains them via the predefined variables and categories or eliminates the cases that present them themselves as exceptions. Through this explanation and elimination process, the researcher inevitably redefines the characteristics of the case under investigation (Portes, 1998). The outcome is relabeling and essentializing phenomena into our predetermined definitions rather than explanation of the mechanisms in play (Goldthorpe, 2001; Kiser & Hechter, 1991). Thus, “the only way of guaranteeing closure or zero exceptions turns out to be an explanation that is a logical corollary of the effect to be explained” (Portes, 1998, p. 20). For instance, according to the national models, the argument is that an ethnic nationalism causes restrictive policies and vice versa, and if the nationalism is not ethnic, it does not cause restrictive policies. Similarly, a set of civic immigration policies beget civic nationalism and vice versa, and if nationalism is not civic, it does not produce civic policies. There is no out of this circular logic.

Not surprisingly, the use of the national models leads to essentialism, an attempt to relabel and fit the empirical cases into either one of the national models. For instance, most recent studies start with a set of a priori variables and characteristics associated with each national model, choose nation-states that might come close to the respective model, and asses if the country’s policies match the model’s prediction. Here, some studies find nations and groups that fall outside the scope of the models. These “unstructured” groups simultaneously subscribe to the logic of two or three national models and, in turn, lead to contradictory predictions about immigration policies (Wright, Citrin & Wand, 2012; Citrin & Wright, 2009). These cases challenge the causal logic of the national models. Since, for instance, in a country with civic nationalism we should expect to observe support for civic immigration policies. Any empirical deviances become either
exceptions or negligible errors. Under the pre-eminence of the national models, these studies do not explore the implications of the empirical deviances. Instead they collapse the in-between groups into the categories provided by the national models to argue that, for instance, there are “pure” civic nationalists and a majority of ethnic nationalists (Wright, Citrin & Wand, 2012).

The national models cannot account for immigration policy changes and varieties of nationalisms outside the mold of the models. We yet have to explore the possibility of other forms of correlation between nationalism and immigration policies without assuming a causal relation between the two. The example of Canada restricting its immigration policies would represent a correlation between multicultural nationalism and restrictive policies often associated with ethnic nationalism. This correlation is not accounted for by the national models. The case of implementing jus soli laws in Germany would represent a correlation between German ethnic nationalism, if there is any such thing, and civic immigration policy. The pre-1917 German Empire also defined belonging based on residence in territory (Brubaker, 1992). In both instances, Germany should fall into the civic category. This correlation is not accounted for by the national models. To date, the following correlations remain unexamined. Table 2 also visualizes the missing relations in terms of which concepts correspond with which policies – depending on academic support for the concepts of ethnic, civic, and multicultural nationalism despite the critique presented here.

**Figure 14 - missing relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic nationalism (ethnic ancestry)</th>
<th>Liberal immigration and citizenship Policy</th>
<th>Civic immigration and citizenship policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism (territory, rights)</td>
<td>Restrictive immigration and citizenship policies</td>
<td>Liberal immigration and citizenship Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multi)Cultural nationalism (culture, religion)</td>
<td>Restrictive immigration and citizenship policies</td>
<td>Civic immigration and citizenship policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 Boswell and Hampshire’s (2017) work comes closest to comprehensively addressing the relation between nationalisms and immigration policymaking. Their approach identifies two elements of nationalisms to connect the role of party politics and politicians, and the role of institutional environments and legacies with the processes of policymaking. Boswell and Hampshire (2017, p. 133) draw on theories of discursive institutionalism to analyze “how political actors can exercise agency through the strategic mobilization of ideas” while “discursive strategies can in turn modify the background ideas that shape policy”. This theoretical analysis remains at macro-level and does not account for the role of micro and banal everyday interactions for national policies (Billig, 1995).
Several scholars have already pointed out the national models have become tautological models which impair comparative studies (Bertossi, Duyvendak & Scholten, 2015; see also Bertossi, 2011; Favell, 2003). The main argument here is that, as we have also argued, the national models do not have universal explanatory values (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Kunovich, 2009; Shulman, 2002). The stoicism of the models ignores the disparities in national values and immigration policies among the countries that, according to the models, fall within same category (Larin, 2020; Abu-Laban, 2019; Jensen, 2019; Mouritsen et al., 2019). For instance, immigration policies in two countries with the same form of nationalism might be different since what is considered ethnic nationalism in Germany is quite different from ethnic nationalism in other countries such as Israel where religion rather ethnicity is the prime factor of national belonging.

Conclusion

In this paper we argued that the national models are the culmination of several waves and strands of scholarly work on ethnic, civic, and multicultural nationalism as well as citizenship and immigration policies. We demonstrated that the national models presume the existence of causal relations between nationalism and immigration policies while the correlation between the two is a spurious one. We also argued that the national models have not addressed the question of developing ideal-types, or even coherent real-type clusters, based on random case selection so to theorize the causal relations between the concepts and their effects.

Over two decades of research based on the national models in migration studies has resulted in tautological arguments that take the concepts as synonymous with the effects, the nationalism as synonymous with immigration policy and vice versa. Not only the national models are now mute in the face of the rapidly changing immigration policies in the Western world, their tautological (il)logic makes it rather impossible to account for the correlations that fall beyond the relations laid out by the ethnic, civic, cultural models. The question is whether to persist on thinking with the national models or perhaps entertain the idea of thinking without the tautological national models.

To examine the relation between nationalism and immigration policy requires a robust theoretical and methodological approach that can be used across periods and contexts without becoming tautological and essentialist. We need ideal-type deductive theorization that allows future research to construct hypotheses on the quality and directionality of the correlation between nationalism and immigration policy. Or, we can rely on inductive real-type empirical observations that come closest to determining the correlation between nationalism and immigration policy.

It is important not to confuse between the two approaches, the conceptually and theoretically developed causal relations of the ideal-types and the empirically observable phenomena of the real-types. This means that, as the implicit fallacy of the national models, a single case study and the observed correlations cannot be generalized onto other cases. 

Table 2- relations identified √, and relations remaining unexamined?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic nationalism (ethnic ancestry)</th>
<th>Civic nationalism (territory, rights)</th>
<th>(multi)Cultural nationalism (culture, religion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive immigration policies</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic immigration policies</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal immigration policies</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
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</table>
must thus resist the urge to hastily develop analytical typologies and regimes. The problem with these typologies, as reflected in the limits of the national models vis-à-vis the recent policy changes, is that understanding the bigger picture comes at the cost of not being “able to dwell on the detailed characteristics of” each case (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 2).

Portes (1998, p. 20) recommends a set of logical steps to take to avoid circling back to tautological arguments. First, to separate the concepts from their effects, to separate nationalism from their alleged policy effects. Or, if the policy is the central concept, separating the policy from their outcome in the form of national values and traditions (see also Jensen, 2019). Second, to establish controls for causal directionality so that it is possible to observe the concept independent and prior to its effect. Third, testing for alternative correlations and contributing factors. This is a time-consuming process. The two latter steps in particular are rather ambitious procedures which attempt at imitating the “lucidity and realism of the hard sciences … to mirror the structure of the world” (Alexander, 2011, p. 87).

It is important to define what form of policy is the subject of the investigation. Nationalism, depending on how it is defined and what elements are included in this definition, has disparate correlation with citizenship, immigration, integration, and refugee laws. In a recent study of drivers of immigration policy reforms in 21 Western nations, Natter, Czaika, and de Haas (2020) show that immigration policies at large remain unaffected by political parties’ ideologies while partisan ideological decisions directly impact integration and asylum policies. The distinction between nationalisms and various forms of immigration policies would allow for discerning the particularities as well as the common patterns across contexts and epochs (Abu-Laban, 2019).

To understand policy change it is imperative to examine policies and various aspects of national debates in each country since these policy changes do not follow a pre-determined unidirectional logic as perceived by the national models (Consterdine & Hampshire, 2019, p. 17).

In the policy-oriented, if not policy-obsessed, field of comparative migration studies, the typological national models have provided readily available answers and templates to understand but also to circumscribe the relation between nationalisms and immigration policies. Since the analytical limits of these models have now come to our attention, researchers from across the disciplines should re-think the ways we study the tensions between the increasing diversities and nationalism in a world where “migration has turned from an orphan of the global order to one of its primary challengers” (Goodman & Schimmelfennig, 2020, p. 1104).
References


