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Implementing the UN Global Compacts by Institutionalising a New Hybrid Organisational Form

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Abstract

This working paper outlines a research project on the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration. Despite their explicitly non-binding character, both these multilateral texts require complex follow-up and review mechanisms. The latter are underpinned by a new hybrid organisational form that combines the convening of periodic meetings with the bureaucratic control and implementation of technical and material resources. However, the open-ended character of the implementation of the compacts begs the question of the durability and potential permanence of this hybrid organisation form. Building on the literature of organisation studies, this research project asks the question of how the implementation of the compacts institutionalises this hybrid organisational form. This would depend on the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration and their practices of problematising, theorising and legitimising the hybrid organisational form. Nevertheless, this institutionalisation would have to grapple with three sources of complexity arising both from the institutional environment and the hybrid organisational form. To begin assessing the institutionalisation practices of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration, this working paper textually analyses two important reports on the implementation of the compacts: the first report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to the UN General Assembly following the adoption of the GCR and the first report of the UN Secretary General on the GCM.

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List of abbreviations

CRRF   Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

GCFF   Global Concessional Financing Facility

GCM   Global Compact for Migration

GCR   Global Compact on Refugees

GFMD   Global Forum on Migration and Development

GRF   Global Refugee Forum

IMRF   International Migration Review Forum

IO   International Organisation

IOM   International Organisation for Migration

NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation

UN   United Nations

UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

The Euro-Mediterranean migration and refugee crisis of 2015 highlighted the complexity and uncertainty of the protracted movement of millions of 'undesirable' refugees, asylum seekers and migrants fleeing political violence and economic hardship (Agier, 2008, pp. 12–13). To address this 'wicked problem' of globalisation (Rittel & Webber, 1973, pp. 160–161), over 120 states agreed to the 2016 New York Declaration whereby they pledged to cooperate within the United Nations (UN) framework. They additionally linked two regimes hitherto separated in multilateral settings: refugee protection and migration governance (Thouez, 2019, pp. 1245–1246). The states' commitments translated into two Global Compacts adopted on the 17th of December 2018 by the UN General Assembly: The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Although few states fearful for their sovereignty opposed their parallel negotiation and endorsement (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, pp. 105–106), policy practitioners and scholars alike extolled the compacts as critical milestones (Grandi, 2019; Vitorino, 2019; Gilbert, 2019). Despite their explicitly non-binding character, the compacts required new types of discourses and practices to govern the mobility of refugees and migrants. Indeed, both texts contained a 'normative argumentation' (Fairclough 2006: 35) about what ought (not) to happen and to be done. The GCR offered four objectives to 'share responsibility' between states: easing pressure on host societies; encouraging refugee self-reliance; expanding third-country solutions; supporting conditions in countries of origin for repatriation and voluntary return (UN, 2018b, p. 2). Whereas the GCM listed twenty-three objectives, along with their relevant policy instruments and best practices, to enact a so-called comprehensive approach to migration (UN, 2018a, pp. 5–6).

The academic literature examined the substantive content of the compacts to question their distinction between refugees and migrants (Costello, 2019), the gap between their stated goals and reality (Hansen, 2018; Martin & Ruhs, 2019; Pécoud, 2020), their acknowledgment of binding human rights legal frameworks (Guild et al., 2019; Majcher, 2019), their linkage with the development regime (Miller, 2019), and their lack of a definition of forced migrants (Jubilut & Casagrande, 2019). Notwithstanding the compacts' strengths and weaknesses, Ferris and Martin remarked 'that the ultimate proof of their worth will be in their implementation' (2019, p. 6). Given their performative nature, both texts entail complex 'follow-up and review mechanisms'. The GCR requires that the UNHCR and the states co-convene a Global Refugee Forum (GRF) every four years beginning in 2019. Additionally, the UNHCR has to report annually to the UN General Assembly, design indicators of success for each of the compact's objectives, provide the template for stakeholders' pledges to support its objectives, and 'measure the impact arising from hosting, protecting and assisting refugees' (UN, 2018b, p. 20). The GCM similarly expects the meeting of an intergovernmental International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) every four years starting in 2022. Each forum must subsequently address a 'progress declaration' to the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (UN, 2018a, p. 34). The GCM also tasks the UN Network on Migration with the setting up of a 'capacity building mechanism'. It consists of a connection hub for developing so-called solutions, a start-up fund for implementation projects, and a global knowledge platform to store up 'best practices' (UN, 2018a, pp. 32–33). Finally, 'drawing on the UN Network on Migration', the UN Secretary General must biennially report to the UN General Assembly on the implementation of the GCM (UN, 2018a, p. 33).

The Institutional Work Behind the Implementation of the UN Compacts

One striking feature of these follow-up and review mechanisms lies in their open-ended character. In contrast to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2015-2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the compacts are not explicitly bound by an expiry

date. For instance, the UN Secretary General noted that 'there is no identifiable finish line for implementing [the GCM]' (UN, 2020c, p. 3). This ambiguity begs the question of the durability and the potential permanence of the compacts' mechanisms as 'institutions in their own right [which could] harness the otherwise discordant forces of their milieu' (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 246). Drawing on insights from organisation studies, this research project seeks to answer the following research question: **how the implementation of the UN Global Compacts institutionalises a new hybrid organisational form to govern migration and refugees?** An *organisational form* conceptualises a 'configuration of structures and practices given coherence by underlying values regarded as appropriate within an institutional context' (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, p. 30). I argue that the agreed-upon objectives, expectations and plans of the compacts extend the normative scaffolding which sustains a two-dimensional organisational form (Ruggie, 1998, pp. 55–56). To render interstate conduct intelligible, it combines the (1) network dimension of organising social actors with the (2) bureaucratic dimension of technocratic and routinised control and implementation of financial and technical resources (Ruggie, 1998, p. 2). The first dimension consists of the periodic forums of the compacts which constitute as many 'communication episodes' (Blaschke et al., 2012, p. 880). They would foster sustained and interlocked ties between state and nonstate actors despite missing a formal authority to resolve potential conflicts among them (Clegg et al., 2016, p. 278). The second dimension consists of all the 'governmental technologies' – i.e. the practical mechanisms of notation, recording and compiling information (Dean, 1999, pp. 269–270) – required by the compacts. They rely on the expertise of the bureaucracies of international organisations (IOs) to channel the states' conduct (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005, p. 162). States effectively delegated the 'practical' implementation of the compacts to the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration. The latter are tasked with reporting, funnelling funds, designing and applying technology-driven solutions to the mobility of refugees and migrants (Dillard & Burris, 1993, pp. 158–159).

This hybrid organisational form distinguishes the compacts from past multilateral initiatives in the 2000s that aimed to persuade states of the benefits of international cooperation through informal policy dialogue alone [1]. Considering the non-binding nature of the compacts, their significance consists not so much in their ability to realise the 'mythical horizon' (Pécoud, 2020, p. 5) they outline of a well-governed human mobility. It rather resides in their ability to 'usher a more centralised orchestration' (Thouez, 2019, p. 1251) of both the global refugee regime, which lacks 'a clearly defined system of governance' (Betts & Milner, 2019, p. 1), and the fragmented global governance of migration (Kainz & Betts, 2020). That this why this research project seeks to assess the *institutionalisation process* of the compacts' organisational form. This would determine whether the latter can become embedded within the migration and refugee regimes as a legitimate and self-evident institution of deliberation and organisation or end up as an 'expandable tool' (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1087; Selznick, 1984, p. 5). The institutionalisation depends on the persistent 'institutional work' (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) performed by organisations or inter-organisational networks. This work is necessary because emerging organisational forms are usually contested in their legitimacy and trigger conflicts (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, p. 30). The institutional work required to successfully maintain an organisational form entails three practices (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, pp. 1087–1088): (1) the problematisation of the extant organisational arrangements and the conducts of social actors as

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[1] The Global Consultations on International Protection, the Berne Initiative, the Global Commission on International Migration and the UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development provided between 2001 and 2006 as many informal venues to garner states' support for sundry non-binding principles for international cooperation (Betts & Milner, 2019, pp. 4–5; Kalm, 2012, pp. 54–56). They were, however, devoid of any form of recurring bureaucratic control and implementation practices. This is also the case of the Global Forum on Migration and Development; however, contrary to these past initiatives, it institutionalised through recurrent meetings of states and NGOs since 2007 (Rother, 2019).

inadequate; (2) the theorisation of the rules and practices of the new organisational form as superior to the failing alternatives; (3) the legitimation of the new form as beneficial by persuading various audiences of its worth and advantages. Since oppositions marked the negotiations and endorsements of the compacts, the institutionalisation of their hybrid organisational form is likely to face contestation. Consequently, this research project aims to examine the ways in which the IOs responsible for the implementation of both compacts struggle to enact and institutionalise their follow-up and review mechanisms. The institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration is all the more crucial as the procedures to operate these mechanisms were 'still to be worked out' and 'unclear' at the inception of the compacts (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, pp. 125–126).

The Institutional Environment and Institutionalisation

The institutionalisation of an organisational form implies its further immersion and embeddedness in a broader institutional environment. In the international relations literature, Keohane (1969) was first to raise the issue of institutionalisation as a process of organisational distinctiveness from the institutional environment. In his analysis of the UN General Assembly, he conceptualised institutionalisation as a three-dimensional process whereby organisations become differentiated, durable, and autonomous from their environment (e.g. the international system) (Keohane, 1969, p. 861). Organisations must possess sharp boundaries with their environment to develop capabilities to act and adapt to its fluctuations. Therefore, the efficacy of the institutionalisation very much depends 'on the nature of the environment […] as well as on internal characteristics of the organisation' (Keohane, 1969, p. 863). Nevertheless, Keohane is part of a long string of scholars equating the institutionalisation of organisations with their level of bureaucratisation and professionalisation (Wellhofer, 1972; Martens, 2005; Beauvallet, 2003; Debre & Dijkstra, 2020). Indeed, the extensive indicators which Keohane devised to measure institutionalisation favoured the internal bureaucratic characteristics of organisations (e.g. level of experience of the personnel, presence of internal promotion patterns, shifts in leadership, control of material resources, etc.). In contrast, his measurement of the environment merely assessed its *expected* stability or volatility (Keohane, 1969, p. 866). Surprisingly, Keohane suggested that this indicator requires scholars to rely 'on the best predictions […] that they can find' (Keohane, 1969, p. 866).

Keohane's lack of concern for what is the case in the extant international system results from his primary focus on the organisations' distinctiveness from their environment. This straitens the role of the latter to either externally facilitating or impeding the agency of organisations. Kay (1969) argued that such clear-cut isolation of organisations from their environment leads to comprehend the former as producing outputs independently from the latter. Schmitter (1971, p. 936) epitomises this as his endeavour to design a more parsimonious operationalisation than Keohane's similarly assumes that organisational development independently impacts the environment. This relegates states which constitute a major part of the environment to external objects or at least ex post implementors of the organisations' decisions (Kay, 1969, p. 952). Rather than solely being function of the interactions of internal organisational characteristics, Kay (1969, p. 953) indicates that institutionalisation must contend with the states' efforts to impose their inputs-demands within the boundaries of organisations. Hence, institutionalisation is not so much a bureaucratic matter of independent and efficient production of outcomes. It is a political process which constitutes organisations as arenas of contention and bargaining which deal with environmental demands (Kay, 1969, p. 953).

Recasting institutionalisation as political entails focusing on the influence of 'normative pressures' which arise from the state (Zucker, 1987, p. 443). These pressures result in the adoption by organisations of 'legitimated elements' – e.g. standard operating procedures, state

requirements – which do not necessarily contribute to either their distinctiveness or betterment of their task execution (Zucker, 1987, p. 443). Thus, institutionalisation occurs when organisations become 'infused with value' by their members and other social actors irrespectively of their ability to achieve instrumental goals (Selznick, 1984, p. 40; Huntington, 2006, p. 246; Levitsky, 1998, p. 79). To ensure their survival, organisations cannot rely on bureaucratic and material resources alone (Scott, 2014, p. 71). They require legitimacy so that their constituents would perceive their actions as 'appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions' (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). As indicated by Zucker (1987, pp. 444–445), organisational neo-institutionalists assume that value infusion takes place as an isomorphic reproduction of systemwide social facts at the organisational-level (see Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Far from Keohane's distinctiveness, organisations institutionalise by becoming legitimate through compliance with the sometimes coercive state requirements (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 41). Other neo-institutionalists highlighted instead the importance of the imitation between organisations for institutionalisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151). Nevertheless, construing institutionalisation either as organisational isomorphism or interorganisational mimesis implies that the environment uniformly constrains organisations regardless of their features. Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 95) noted that this is tantamount to portraying the environment as independent and distinct from the organisational actions of compliance. This leads neo-institutionalists to correlate normative pressures with the supposedly independent, forcible, and homogenising demands of the state to the detriment of the 'widespread beliefs, practices, and norms' (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 95).

Building upon Giddens' theory of structuration, Barley and Tolbert defined institutionalisation instead as underlined by the ontological and epistemological conundrum of the relationship between structure-environment and agency-organisation (Hay, 2002, p. 113). While Keohane, Schmitter and neo-institutionalists alike tended to resolve it by favouring one over the other (Reed, 2006), Barley and Tolbert liken this relationship to the one between grammar and speech. Although the speech-organisational action may infinitely vary, it must conform to the underlying set of tacitly shared rules of grammar-environment to become intelligible and institutionalised (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, pp. 96–97). However, the adherence to such 'taken-for-granted' rules and the (in)appropriate conduct they delineate is by no means systematic and homogenised. Through 'choice and action' organisations can deliberately perpetuate, modify or eliminate them in their everyday activity following some alternative vision of appropriateness (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 94). Thus, for organisations to institutionalise, to acquire a 'normative, factual quality' (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 102), they must deploy a relational organisational action that is neither a clear-cut mimicking nor differing from the environment. They must strategically create legitimacy through sustained institutional work that navigates, leverages or confronts taken-for-granted but sometimes contradictory state demands, rules, identities and understandings (Scott, 2014, p. 74).

Indeed, contrary to neo-institutionalist assumptions about the unitary and static nature of the environment, many organisations face competing pressures for conformity from uncoordinated and conflicting actors that they depend upon (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457). These tensions may favour the development of new organisational forms as antagonism is 'positively related to the emergence of agency within an institutional context' (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 462). Yet to avoid being 'buffeted about by the competing demands of its member state environment' (Schmitter, 1971, p. 919), organisations must 'exercise some level of strategic choice' (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 461). Which leads them to 'interpret these pressures in varying ways and construct a variety of responses' (Scott, 2014, p. 188). To gain, safeguard or repair their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), organisations may engage in sensemaking and deploy verbal accounts and explanations to gain credit or elude blame (Elsbach, 1994; Weick et al., 2005). They may creatively combine divergent institutional logics through oscillation or synthesis (Jay, 2013; Mair et al., 2015), attempt to negotiate the institutional requirements of the environment

(Lawrence et al., 2001). Or they may develop paradoxical legitimacy strategies that simultaneously manipulate, adapt and reason with the environmental pressures (Pache & Santos, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013). But whatever the response(s) organisations may devise, to institutionalise they must render any alternative 'literally unthinkable' (Zucker, 1983, p. 5).

Institutionalisation and Environmental/Organisational Complexity

Zucker's 'famous turn of phrase' (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 5) coincides with this research project's institutionalisation practices which strive to suppress any alternative to the compacts' organisational form. Although this may entail emphasising the distinctive features of the latter, institutionalisation is not reducible to a process of gathering sufficient bureaucratic and material resources. As argued by the neo-institutionalist literature, legitimacy plays a crucial role in the institutionalisation process. Yet it does not stem from the systematic and homogenised reproduction of a unitary and static environment. An institutional work is necessary to garner legitimacy by relationally navigating the rather fragmented, complex, and contradictory environment. This work reproduces or consciously modifies the environment's recurrent interactions through problematisation, theorisation and legitimisation. Additionally, when it comes to the institutionalisation of hybrid organisational forms, the institutional work needs to overcome internal tensions originating from the former's incorporation of multiple institutional logics and dependency on the support of various actors with divergent expectations (Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010; Ramus et al., 2020). However, the outcome of such institutional work is uncertain. If it is unable to respond to conflicting demands emanating from the environment and the organisational form, the break-up or paralysis of the latter could ensue (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 468).

That is why, this research project does not anticipate a straightforward institutionalisation of the compacts' new hybrid organisational form. It hypothesises that the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration must tackle three sources of complexity arising both from the hybrid organisational form and its institutional environment. If the institutional work leaves them unresolved, legitimacy challenges could then weaken the institutionalisation of the hybrid organisational form (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1088).

Indeed, the first source of complexity stems from the fact that the hybrid organisational form is at the intersection of overlapping and nonhierarchical elemental regimes (migration, refugee protection, human rights, development, environment) and institutions (states, local authorities, IOs, NGOs, corporations, epistemic communities). While these elemental regimes and institutions may share a common goal (implementing the compacts), the absence of a clear hierarchy between them can generate rival authority claims and preferences (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 331). In such complex environment, 'there is no way to definitively resolve questions about which rules, norms, or decision-making procedures take precedence' (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 332). This is compounded by the fact that the compacts did not straighten out this regime complexity thus leaving their implementations unclear. The GCM reflects divergent state interests (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, p. 117) and aggregates 'a range of competing priorities [stemming from various elemental regimes] (with little guidance on how to reconcile them, or trade them off)' (Costello, 2019, p. 643). While the GCR did not address the overlap between refugee protection and migration notably when it comes to refugees that are part of so-called mixed migration flows (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, p. 111).

Nevertheless, this uncertainty can favour the agency of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration. When regime complexity marks the institutional environment, 'characterisations of the problem [that should be resolved] decisively shapes outcomes' (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 17). The institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration would allow them to establish appropriate problematisations and choose between the rules, norms, and procedures

that should underlie the hybrid organisational form. But without a prior consensus on the features of the follow-up and review mechanisms of the compacts, divergent state demands and expectations regarding the goals and means of the hybrid organisational form could hinder its institutionalisation (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 460). If the institutional work leaves these antagonisms unresolved (especially those over goals), further proliferation and fragmentation could ensue. States may defect and create new agreements to rival elements of the compacts and their hybrid organisational form (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 332; Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 19). Therefore, the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration must remove part or all these contradictions throughout the institutionalisation process. Their problematisation practice would need to either acquiesce to the claims and demands of some elemental regimes and institutions rather than others (e.g. development over human rights; states over NGOs), balance a large array of claims and demands, or avoid and defy some of them (Pache & Santos, 2010, pp. 462–463).

Moreover, the hybridity of the compacts' organisational form is in and of itself a second source of complexity as it combines different values and practices (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1086). The nonhierarchical and political interaction and bargaining of the network dimension could potentially contradict and contest the bureaucratic dimension which favours 'policy without politics' (Ojha et al., 2016); namely, the top-down and instrumental implementation of generic solutions to eliminate politicised influences (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005, p. 164). An unresolved contradiction within the hybrid organisational form could disconnect it from states' heterogeneous demands and local contexts or render it pragmatically inefficient in consistently achieving the compacts' objectives (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012, p. 7; Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1088). Thus, the efficacy of the theorisation of the superiority of the hybrid institutional form hinges on the ability of the institutional work of the UNHRC and the UN Network on Migration to address this eventual contradiction.

Finally, the degree in which the organisations or inter-organisational networks attending to the required institutional work are themselves institutionalised constitutes a source of complexity. It determines whether these organisations can draw on an established and regime specific authority (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1086). When their institutional position and role are legitimate, organisations and networks can fully make use of both their 'moral and expert authority' (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, pp. 23–24) to convince other social actors of the worth of their institutional work. In contrast, the lack of such established position and role limits their authority to expressing either moral or instrumental claims. This restricts the organisations' ability to induce the necessary deference towards their institutional work across multiple audiences. That is why, the inability of the UNHCR or the UN Network on Migration to deploy both moral and expert authority could hamper the effectiveness of their legitimation practice throughout the institutionalisation process.

Although the implementations of both compacts are likely to face the effects of the first two sources of complexity, they are not on an equal footing when it comes to the third. The UNHCR is 'largely responsible for overseeing and coordinating' (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, p. 125) both dimensions of the organisational form of the GCR. On the other hand, the UN Network on Migration is a newly created inter-organisational network that is confined to the bureaucratic dimension of the implementation of the GCM. Therefore, the well-established position of the UNHCR would allow it to appear both as a moral and expert authority on refugees during the implementation process of the GCR (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, pp. 23–24). Whereas, the UN Network on Migration could be restricted to only making use of its expert authority. Indeed, the UN Secretary General created the network to fulfil a technical task which ostensibly precludes it from claiming a moral authority in implementing the GCM. Moreover, its inception signalled that none of its members were deemed as holding a sufficient and well-established position and authority to implement the compact alone (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1088). But the UN Network on Migration could still be able to strengthen its institutional work by achieving its own institutionalisation (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, pp. 1086–1087). A bolstered authority of the

network hedges on its ability to construct a collective voice and arbitrate between its members' practices and rules.

Institutionalisation as (Textual) Practices

To assess the institutionalisation of the hybrid organisational form of the compacts this research project relies on the 'practice tracing' methodology of qualitative analysis (Pouliot, 2014; Adler & Pouliot, 2011). The institutionalisation is a process whereby a community of actors, that do not share the same goals and interests, embody, act out, and possibly reify its three practices of problematising, theorising, and legitimising (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 6). These 'ways of doing things' are what enables agents to reproduce or transform the institutional environment (Pouliot, 2014, p. 241; Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 6). The practices giving shape to the institutionalisation take place within the context of the implementation of the follow-up and review mechanisms of each compact. Although this context is explicitly pursuing the most efficient achievement of the objectives of the compacts, the practices of institutionalisation implicitly permeate the various implementation activities. Hence, the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration is paramount to understand the convening of events (policy meetings and negotiations), the production of documents (reports, declarations, speeches), and the design and rolling out of governmental technologies (measurement and capacity building mechanisms) constitutive of the implementation of the compacts.

To reconstruct and interpret their institutional work, this research project would rely on the textual analysis of the grey literature on the implementation activities of the compacts (Pouliot, 2014, p. 248). Their analysis would offer insights into the key steps of the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration and trace how the three practices of institutionalisation unfold over time. This would in turn highlight how this institutional work faced the sources of complexity, and any potential legitimacy challenges, to attempt to achieve the outcome of institutionalising the hybrid organisational form. This research project expects that the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration would be enacted through textual strategies of evaluation, classification, and legitimation. These strategies communicate with various audiences throughout the institutionalisation process of the hybrid organisational form (Fairclough, 2003). Indeed, this research project puts communication – i.e. social interaction that builds on speech, documents, and discourses (Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 15) – at the forefront of institutionalisation. It is not merely an expression or reflection 'of inner thoughts or collective intentions, but [it is] potentially formative of institutional reality' (Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 15).

The first practice of problematisation which requires the institutional work of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration to 'delegitimise and diagnose' (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1087) the extant institutional arrangements. This would subject specific elemental regimes and institutions to evaluating statements, statements of facts, and hypothetical and predictive statements (Fairclough, 2003, p. 109). By stressing the inadequate features of well-established arrangements, these statements would attempt to disturb and break 'locked-in patterns of behaviour and thought' to situate the new hybrid organisational form within the extant institutional environment (R. E. Meyer et al., 2017, pp. 401–402).

The second practice of theorising the superiority of the new form's rules and ways of interacting and its ability to overcome the 'diagnosed shortcomings' (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1087) would depend on the institutional work's ability to establish classifications – i.e. creating difference or equivalence – between the new and the extant arrangements (Fairclough, 2003, p. 88). To garner support and create consensus, this classification would explain the superior relevance and ability of the hybrid organisational form to provide solutions to the issues highlighted by the problematisation (R. E. Meyer et al., 2017, p. 403).

The third practice of legitimation would consist in persuading audiences about the intrinsic worth and advantages of the new organisational forms through 'legitimating accounts' (Huybrechts & Haugh, 2018, p. 1088). Specifically, the institutional work would involve various strategies of legitimation (Fairclough, 2003, p. 98): by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and of persons or organisations in whom moral or expert authority is vested (authorisation); by reference to the utility of the new organisational form (rationalisation); by reference to value systems (moral evaluation); by development of descriptive and predictive narratives (mythopoesis). These strategies aimed at creating legitimacy would justify the new organisational form by situating it within 'prevailing normative prescriptions' so that it could become taken-for-granted and unchallenged across audiences (R. E. Meyer et al., 2017, p. 406).

Examining the Institutionalisation Practices Through an Analysis Sheet

To synthesise the analysis of these institutionalisation and textual practices, this working paper relies on an 'analysis sheet' to guide the reading of the various texts of the implementation of the compacts. Drawing on the indications of Rudman and Dennhardt (2014, p. 143), the analysis sheet contains questions informed by the (1) the research question; (2) the hypothesis; and (3) the tools to deconstruct the texts (see textbox 1). The analysis sheet would allow for a more systemic assessment of the relevant texts of the grey literature and facilitate the cross-text analysis required to grasp the institutionalisation of the hybrid organisational form of the compacts (Rudman & Dennhardt, 2014, p. 142). To do so, the reading and analysis of each relevant text would need to observe a standardised procedure. Following an open reading of a given text to make sense of its overall form and content, the analysis sheet has to be filled by answering each question through examples and quotations taken from the text (Huot et al., 2016, p. 134). The individual analysis of multiple text would then be compared to identify and interpret similarities, variations, and absences across texts (Rudman & Dennhardt, 2014, p. 146).

Textbox 1. Analysis sheet

(1) *Questions informed by the research question:*

- How is the text problematising the extant arrangements? (What is being problematised? Where is the problem located? Which social actors are responsible for the failures?)
- How is the text theorising the superiority of the new hybrid organisational form? (How is it superior to the extant arrangements? What solutions are to be achieved? What rules and ways of interacting are favoured by the hybrid organisational form to realise them?)
- How is the text legitimising the hybrid organisational form? (What legitimating account does the text develop? Which audience is targeted by the account? What advantages this audience needs to consider?)

(2) *Questions informed by the hypothesis:*

- How does the regime complexity manifest itself in the text? (What elemental regimes and institutions are referenced?) How is the text tackling the regime complexity? (Which regimes and institutions take precedence, are combined, or ignored/defied?)
- Is the text identifying contradictions between the network and bureaucratic dimensions of the hybrid organisational form? How is the text addressing these contradictions?
- What type of authority is the text assigning to the UNHCR/UN Network on Migration? What rule, norm or text underpin this authority?

(3) *Questions informed by the tools for deconstruction:*

- What evaluating statements problematise the extant arrangements? (How is the text making use of evaluating statements, statements of facts, and hypothetical/predictive statements?)
- What classifications support the theorisation of the hybrid organisational form? (What difference and equivalence are created between the hybrid organisational form and existent arrangements?)
- What strategies of legitimation support the legitimating account of the text? Which strategy is most favoured and which one is absent?

The Institutionalisation Practices of the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration

Nevertheless, fully carrying out the research project outlined above is outside the scope of this working paper. Indeed, two years following the adoption of the GCR and the GCM, the events, documents and governmental technologies that involved the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration are numerous. However, to begin making sense of the latter's institutional work, a good place to start would be to examine the first report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to UN General Assembly of August 2019 (UNHCR, 2019b) and the first report of the UN Secretary General on the GCM of October 2020 which drew on the UN Network on Migration (UN, 2020c). Both these texts are important as they aim to take stock of the implementations of the GCR and GCM. Thus, they would clearly contain and epitomise the problematisation, theorisation and legitimation practices enacted by the UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration at the initial stage of the implementation of the compacts.

The First Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the GCR

State Pressures on Displaced People and the Lack of Resettlement

In its first annual report to the UN General Assembly since the adoption of the GCR, the High Commissioner for Refugees problematised the inadequacy of the extant arrangements of the refugee regime by stating the fact that the 'displacement levels remain high [in 2018-19]' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 1). To reinforce this problematisation, the report presented the UNHCR's estimation of the number of displaced people in the world (70.8 million). The report then disaggregated this quantifiable fact to indicate the number of refugees, internally displaced people, and the newly displaced. It also contextualised it by enumerating various crises throughout the world – e.g. the Rohingya refugee crisis, conflicts in DR of Congo, Syria and Yemen – that contribute to the number of displaced people.

Based on this factual description of what the case is regarding refugees, the report points to the 'increasing pressure on displaced people to return to unstable situations' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 1). This pressure stems from the negative conducts of 'some countries' that close border crossings, deny access to asylum procedures, and limit the application of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2). It also has to do with the fact that few third countries offered places to resettle refugees. The UNHCR estimated that 'only' 81300 places from 29 states were available for 1.4 million refugees (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 8). Furthermore, the report noted that many countries in which the UNHCR registered asylum applications are lacking a 'functional asylum system' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 3). Thus, the report negatively evaluates a set of problematic arrangements and state conducts that do not help in resolving the protracted displacement of people.

The Hybrid Organisational Form to Materialise Responsibility Sharing

In contrast, the report strives to theorise the ability of the GCR's hybrid organisational form to offer solutions to the high levels of displacement. The main objective of the implementation of the GCR should be to 'translate the principle of responsibility sharing into concrete actions' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 1). The report builds upon this seemingly consensual principle to assign various 'tangible' priorities to the implementation of the GCR so that it could benefit refugees and host countries: [I]ncrease the support for refugee-hosting communities and countries; move away from camp-based response models, when feasible; promote the inclusion of refugees in local communities and programmes; and further mobilize development resources, civil society and the private sector (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 1). While these priorities differentiate the implementation of the GCR from problematised extant arrangements, the report nonetheless notes that the former builds 'on the application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in 15 countries and 2 regions' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 1). Indeed, the report establishes an equivalence between the implementation of the GCR and the CRRF adopted by the 2016 UN Leaders' Summit on Refugees and Migrants (UN, 2016, p. 16). Later included in the annexe of the GCR (UN, 2018b, p. 3), the framework lists the appropriate actions and best practices that need to be applied in large refugee situations. Thus, the report construes part of the implementation of the GCR as the rolling out of the rules and practices of the CRRF (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, p. 111). As the CRRF 'developed its own bureaucracy, complete with roll-outs, steering committees, focal points and workshops' (E. G. Ferris & Donato, 2019, p. 100), the report emphasises the superior and ready to use character of the bureaucratic dimension of the GCR's hybrid organisational form.

Regarding the network dimension of the latter, the report highlights its ability to 'measure the implementation of the GCR' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2). The report expects that the first GRF will allow states to overcome their problematised conducts thanks to three components: '(i) a

ministerial-level meeting, where States and other stakeholders are able to announce pledges and contributions towards the objectives of the GCR; (ii) a platform to exchange good practices and explore ways in which responsibility-sharing could be increased; and (iii) the opportunity to take stock of progress towards achievement of the objectives of the GCR' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2). In a way characteristic of the UN initiatives, the components of the GRF favour proactive, committed, and partnership-based ways of interacting to establish informal coalitions of the 'willing and able' (McKeon, 2017, p. 488; Gabay & Ilcan, 2017, p. 476). This is further illustrated by the system of co-sponsorship set up by the UNHCR in preparation for the GRF to achieve a 'broad alliance of support for mobilising contributions' [2] (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 1). It encourages states to partner with IOs and NGOs to 'act as champions' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2) that lead by example and encourage other states to participate in the GRF. This would help to overcome the problematic conducts of the states.

Legitimating the Hybrid Organisational Form Through the 1951 Convention

The report's theorisation of the hybrid organisational form is immediately followed by the statement that the 'GCR built on the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees […], together with its 1967 Protocol, which form the cornerstone of international refugee protection' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2). Thus, the legitimation of the implementation of the GCR and hence of its hybrid organisational form relies on a straightforward authorisation. This strategy of legitimation also applies to states that have not ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The report emphasises that 'the vast majority of States' continue to respect 'the fundamental principle of non-refoulement' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2).

Nonetheless, authorisation based on the international law and custom is not the sole strategy of legitimation of the hybrid organisational form. The report argues that the GCR provides a framework for 'predictable and equitable responsibility sharing' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 10). The adjectives 'equitable' and 'predictable' display each a different strategy of legitimation. First, the report legitimates the hybrid organisational form through moral evaluation. The implementation of the GCR would allow addressing the inequitable situation in which 'developed countries continued to host a disproportionate number of refugees' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 10). Second, the report carries out a strategy of rationalisation. It hints to the usefulness of the hybrid organisational form by promoting the UNHCR's partnership with the World Bank. Through the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), the latter provides subsidised loans for development projects 'benefiting both the refugee population and host communities' in the states where the CRRF is implemented (World Bank, 2019, p. 6). In sum, these various strategies reflect the report's concern to convince states of the benefits and legitimacy of the GCR's hybrid organisational form.

The Primacy of the Refugee Regime and the Authority of the UNHCR

The reference to the authority of the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the principle of non-refoulement – the latter being codified in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention (Rodenhäuser, 2018) – ties up the report with the global refugee regime. This elemental regime lends the UNHCR the moral authority to problematise the state conducts that violate law and custom. Moreover, it allows the UNHCR to use 'its institutional position as […] promoter of refugee law' (Barnett &

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[2] These contributions consist of 'financial, material and technical assistance, places for resettlement and complementary pathways for admission to third countries or other actions, such as policies or practical initiatives to promote refugee inclusion' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 2).

Finnemore, 2004, p. 25) as a basis for autonomous action on behalf of refugees. This is illustrated by how the UNHCR considers its role in the rolling out of the CRRF: 'whether a CRRF applies in any given situation is a matter for [the] UNHCR to determine' (UNHCR, 2017, p. 1). Thus, by equating the application of the latter to the implementation of the GCR, the report additionally asserts the expert authority of the UNHCR and its ability to autonomously 'make judgements and solve problems' (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 24).

However, while the refugee regime takes precedence in the report, other elemental regimes are referenced. First, the ability of the UNHCR to legitimise the hybrid organisational form hinges on the development regime. The CRRF relies on the funds funnelled through the World Bank. Yet the UNHCR's role in the GCFF is limited by its status of 'non-decision-making observer' within the steering committee responsible for approving funding requests (World Bank, 2019, p. 7). Thus, while paramount for the implementation of the GCR, the issue of its funding does not depend on the UNHCR and the refugee regime. It nonetheless proved to be a pitfall in the case of Tanzania which withdrew from the CRRF to protest the lack of donor support and the requirement to take loans from the World Bank (Hansen, 2018, p. 142; Betts, 2018). Second, the report ambiguously addresses the issue of so-called mixed movements – namely when refugees travel irregularly with migrants. On one hand, it mentions the GCM and the UN Network on Migration as relevant to respond to mixed movements (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 4). But on the other hand, the report considers the GCR to be relevant as 'it foresees burden and responsibility-sharing arrangements for States affected by large mixed movements' (UNHCR, 2019b, p. 4). Thus, the report chose to combine the refugee regime with the texts, institutions and practices of migration governance.

The First Report of the UN Secretary General on the GCM

The COVID-19 Pandemic and the 'Damaging' Conduct of States

Two years after the adoption the GCM, the UN Secretary General published the first report on its implementation in a context marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. The latter constitutes the fulcrum of the report's problematisation of the extant arrangements in migration governance. The report highlights some immediate impacts of the pandemic on migration notably border closures which 'have particularly affected [migrants]' (UN, 2020c, p. 5). Alongside various factual statements on the short-term impact of the pandemic, the report predicts that the concurrent economic recession will 'have a serious impact on migrant workers [in terms of] unemployment, social exclusion, human development challenges, declining remittances and heightened discriminatory discourse and actions vilifying migrants' (UN, 2020c, p. 5). But despite the present and potentially lasting impact of the pandemic, the report regrets that migrants are unable to access support either from the destination or origin countries. In fact, as 'borders are closed […] bilateral and regional arrangements are absent or suspended' (UN, 2020c, p. 5). Even more so, the report denounces 'cases where State measures have exacerbated existing inequalities and eroded migrants' rights and dignity, sometimes even at the cost of their lives' (UN, 2020c, p. 2). To further problematise 'damaging' (UN, 2020c, p. 4) state conducts, the report refers to two other UN Secretary General's reports – a policy brief (UN, 2020a) and a report to the UN Human Rights Council (UN, 2020b) – which bring attention to the 'protection crisis' resulting from the pandemic. If left unaddressed, these conducts 'may entrench restrictions on international movement and the curtailment of rights of people on the move' (UN, 2020a, p. 3). Therefore, based on the description and prediction of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the evaluation of the conduct of states. The report considers that instead of striving for a 'human-rights based collaboration' the latter have not yet 'move[d] beyond a transactional approach' (UN, 2020c, p. 4).

The IMRF and the UN Network on Migration as Tools for Cooperation

However, the report establishes relations of equivalence between the GCM and another set of 'positive [state] policies and practices' (UN, 2020c, p. 4). Indeed, the GCM 'has had a ripple effect in terms of formal and informal [state] cooperation' (UN, 2020c, p. 7). It notably 'solidified the UN General Assembly's commitment to cooperation' (UN, 2020c, p. 7) which is exemplified by the forthcoming quadrennial IMRF and its regional reviews. In this way, the report strives to theorise the superiority of the network dimension of the hybrid organisational form of the GCM. This dimension embodies a 'cooperating' way of interaction that should overcome the problematised extant arrangements and conducts. That is why the UN Secretary General encouraged states to make sure that 'robust discussions' will take place at the IMRF in 2022 (UN, 2020c, p. 18).

The superiority of the bureaucratic dimension of the hybrid organisational form also resides in its capacity to foster collaboration. To stress this point, the report welcomes the fourteen states which pledged to become: 'champions of the Global Compact [which] will work with the [UN] Network on Migration in promoting best practices, peer exchange and the further implementation of the objectives of the Global Compact' (UN, 2020c, p. 7). This quote suggests that the report assigns a wider role to the UN Network on Migration than initially expected. Indeed, the UN Secretary General established the Network primarily to 'promote coordinated action on migration within the [UN] system' (UN, 2020c, p. 15). And while states welcomed the UN Secretary General's decision in the GCM, they limited the Network's role to setting up of a capacity building mechanism (UN, 2018a, p. 33). Yet in a section dedicated to the actions of the Network to implement the GCM (UN, 2020c, pp. 15–17), the report does not only emphasise its ability to coordinate the various parts of the UN system and implement the compact's capacity building mechanism. It also argues for its capacity to 'support member states in their implementation of the GCM' (UN, 2020c, p. 15).

Indeed, the report begins by depicting the Network as coordinated by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) with an Executive Committee of eight agencies and a secretariat staffed by the personnel of the IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF (UN, 2020c, p. 15). By detailing the steps taken to institutionalise the Network, the report seeks to convey the theorisation that the latter 'has […] increased the ability of the [UN] to speak with one voice on migration-related issues' (UN, 2020c, p. 16). But the report's emphasis on the ability of the Network to realise cooperation among its multiple UN agencies also demonstrates the ready to use ability of the bureaucratic dimension of the hybrid organisational form to 'support' states. The report refers to a 'work plan' devised by the UN Network on Migration in July 2019 which pledges to make 'a tangible difference to enhancing cooperation' (UN Network on Migration, 2019, p. 1). To do so, this work plan announced that 'supporting the development of GCM national implementation plans' is a 'core priority' of the Network (UN Network on Migration, 2019, p. 2). Consequently, the report encourages the Network to provide the 'tools, guidance and support for national implementation plans' (UN, 2020c, p. 16). Furthermore, the emphasis on the ability of the Network to speak with one voice leads the UN Secretary General to encourage it to 'highlight best practice and bring attention to urgent situations calling for immediate action' (UN, 2020c, p. 18). Thus, the role of the Network is not limited to streamlining the functioning of the UN system and setting up the GCM's capacity building. In this regard, the report took stock of the rather modest implementation of the three components of the latter. The connection hub materialised as an online discussion space for practitioners while the start-up fund 'generated resources commitments' of twelve million U.S. dollars (UN, 2020c, p. 16).

Legitimating the Hybrid Organisational Form Through Narratives

Similarly to the problematisation, the COVID-19 pandemic is crucial for the legitimation of the hybrid organisational form of the GCM. Based on the description of the present and future impact of the pandemic throughout the report, the UN Secretary General argues that 'the need for greater cooperation across borders […] has become urgent' (UN, 2020c, p. 5). In other words, the pandemic 'highlighted the relevance of the Global Compact and opened new avenues for implementation' (UN, 2020c, p. 4). This mythopoesis – legitimation through narrative – does not only concern the COVID-19 pandemic. The report develops another narrative stressing the complexity of international migration:

> 'Over the past several decades, migration has become increasingly complex, due in part to political, environmental and socioeconomic changes in countries of both origin and destination' (UN, 2020c, p. 1).

> 'Migration is a complex dynamic based on many factors including historical relationships, demography, labour markets, humanitarian and human rights considerations and geography' (UN, 2020c, p. 3).

This narrative is well established in the UN system. It legitimises the implementation of the GCM as the report argues that because of its complexity 'no single State can effectively govern migration without principled and effective international cooperation' (UN, 2020c, p. 1). Thus, this strategy of legitimation is primarily targeting states.

But rationalisation also backs this strategy as the GCM's usefulness for states lies in its capacity to grasp the complexity of migration: '[The GCM] creates a comprehensive 360-degree approach, and a common language, for discussing migration and provides tools for implementing well-governed migration policies' (UN, 2020c, p. 2). Moreover, this 360-degree approach is flexible; its implementation 'will mean different things to different States' (UN, 2020c, p. 3). This flexibility is not only useful for states so that they can grapple with the complexity of migration. It is also a matter of eluding any potential legitimacy challenge. States could defect if a top-down and uniform implementation of the GCM encroaches on their sovereignty. That is why the report recognises the relevance of the national 'context, experience and resources' (UN, 2020c, p. 3). To showcase the leeway states can have, the report reviews their inputs on their 'initiatives' to implement the GCM – e.g. improve migration statistics, carrying out sensitisation campaigns on migration and human rights, providing information on disease control to migrants, participating in the GFMD – by assigning them to the extensive 23 objectives of the compact (UN, 2020c, pp. 7–15). However, the report attempts to make use of authorisation to legitimise and most importantly frame the implementation of the GCM. The latter 'does not start from zero [it is] underpinned by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and international law' (UN, 2020c, pp. 7–15). The Universal Declaration of Human rights underlies the use by the report of moral evaluation. As illustrated by the problematisation, the human rights legitimise the need for the hybrid organisational form to overcome the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Regime Complexity and the Authority of the UN Secretary General

Yet by including the inputs of the states and classifying them along the 23 objectives of the GCM, the report is unsurprisingly rife with references to various elemental regimes and institutions. The report combines 'initiatives' of states and IOs that fall under the umbrella of the human rights, development, health and international travel elemental regimes (UN, 2020c, pp. 7–

15). When possible, the report also emphasises how these initiatives are implemented in partnership with the relevant IOs of the UN Network on Migration. In other words, the report is similar to the GCM in so far as it continues to aggregate a range of competing priorities emanating from multiple elemental regimes. Nonetheless, the report is notable for the absence of any mention of the sovereignty of states. Contrary to the GCM which 'reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy' (UN, 2018a, p. 4), the report evaluates them regardless along a continuum of positive and damaging policies and practices they might pursue. Thus, while the report reproduces the regime complexity facing the implementation of the GCM, it chose to ignore an aspect of states that is important in migration governance. This is possible because the UN Secretary General wrote the report instead of the UN Network on Migration. The former can use his moral authority as the 'protector' of peace, security and human rights to create autonomy and induce deference from the states (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 23). But while the UN Secretary General can wield such authority to ignore the sovereignty of states, the report only assigns an expert authority to the UN Network on Migration. Although the scope of the Network's role is extended beyond the capacity building mechanism of the GCM, the Network still has to 'support' states in the design and implementation of their own plans.

Conclusion

This working paper sought to examine the discursive content of the IOM Strategic Vision to understand how the IOM undertakes its transformation into a more normative organisation through the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the GCM. The IOM Strategic Vision differs from past strategic documents of the organisation. It is the first of such documents that attempts to fix the role and position of the IOM since it became a UN-related organisation in 2016. It is also the first strategic document that explicitly attempts to extensively reorganise the 'activities and mandate' of the IOM based on two external multilateral texts. And unlike most of its predecessors, the policy upper body is the one spearheading the IOM Strategic Vision rather than the member states. To examine this important document in the history of the IOM and highlight its epistemic and normative argumentation, this working paper used the CDA methodology. The epistemic argumentation developed factual statements about the recent events that marked the environment of the global governance of migration. It argued that these events warrant the transformation of the IOM as it could not continue operating as a mere functional organisation. As it will have to respond to both the demands of the member states and the UN system, the IOM would therefore need to abide by a dual functional and normative logic. The normative argumentation further details this by outlining the future composite identity of the organisation by stating the multiple goals the IOM should achieve. These goals blend the organisation's functional role with a more normative one. They notably recontextualize the normative discourse of the UN with the more conventional discourse about the IOM's functional role. This allows the IOM Strategic Vision to proclaim the moral authority of the IOM along its expert authority so that it would become the sole authority over the issue of migration. Additionally, the normative argumentation attempts to mitigate the functional effects of the projectisation of the IOM. Indeed, it assigns overarching priorities and goals, decompartmentalises the projects implemented by the operational lower body, and requires a long-term approach to migration. Finally, the working paper highlights the specificity of the IOM Strategic Vision. To formulate its goals, the document recontextualizes the genre of the corporate narrative. Contrary to past strategic documents, it primarily focuses on telling a 'story' about the organisation so that it would elicit some deference from the member states and the operational lower body of the IOM.

But while this working paper examined the discursive content of the IOM Strategic Vision, the focus on its epistemic and normative argumentation is not enough to adequately assess its impact. Indeed, the IOM Strategic Vision is best understood as being both a discursive and an

organisational strategy that aims to transform the IOM into a more normative IGO. Thus, a more comprehensive CDA of the strategy is required to delve into its relationship with institutional and organisational elements (Fairclough, 2005, p. 924).

Firstly, further research is needed to examine the process of the adoption and implementation of the IOM Strategic Vision. The IOM Strategic Vision must be acknowledged and followed within the institutional context of the IOM throughout its implementation to be able to spur a transformation of the organisation. The policy upper body of the IOM must support the legitimacy of its strategy so that it might become taken-for-granted and unchallenged by the member states (Meyer et al., 2017, p. 406). It would need to enact various textual 'strategies of legitimation' to generate deference (Fairclough, 2003, p. 98): by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and of persons and organisations in whom moral or expert authority is vested (authorisation); by reference to value systems (moral evaluation); by reference to the utility of the strategy (rationalisation). Therefore, a further research on the IOM Strategic Vision would need to analyse how the document C/110/INF/1 contains these strategies. But it will also require examining the reports on the sessions of the IOM governing bodies where the policy upper body and the member states discuss the IOM Strategic Vision (IOM, 2020e). This would indicate how the former applies these strategies to legitimise it in the eyes of the latter.

Secondly, the organisational change expected by the IOM Strategic Vision should also be analysed to scrutinise the potential changes it could engage in how the policy upper body interacts with its member states. To avoid becoming a mere self-legitimising 'imaginary for change', the IOM Strategic Vision must operationalise its discourse 'in new ways of acting and being and new material arrangements' (Fairclough, 2005, p. 931). In other words, an additional analysis of the IOM Strategic Vision must assess whether its operationalisation could result in: the enactment of new ways of acting (e.g. changes in the procedures that regulate the interaction between the IOM and its member states); the inculcation of new ways of being (e.g. changes in the identities of the staff of the IOM and their communicative styles); the materialisation of new arrangements (e.g. changes in the structuring of the organisation) (Fairclough, 2005, p. 934). This will require examining how the IOM Strategic Vision translates into the budgetary documents of the IOM for the years 2020 and 2021 (IOM, 2019b, 2020a, 2020d). But also, how it relies on the 'parallel process' (IOM, 2019d, p. iii) of the application of the Internal Governance Framework. Designed in 2019 by the policy upper body of the IOM, it addresses the fact that 'the IOM has outgrown its governance architecture' (IOM, 2019c, p. 1). The policy upper body supports this framework so that it becomes 'the functional backbone of the Organisation' (IOM, 2019d, p. iii). It considers that the Internal Governance Framework is 'an important driver of [the] successful implementation of the Strategic Vision' (IOM, 2020b, p. 1).

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