Designing for Policy and Institutional Change in Governance

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Abstract

The paper aims to shed more light on the use of systemic design for policy and institutional change in complex governance settings. After presenting brief conceptual background, the paper focuses on a case study, which could be referred to as "stakeholder design of generating systems for policy". The case study refers to the EU project on supporting design of new systems for strategic planning and policy design in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is used to provide an entry point to how design – beyond the usual "creative problem solving" and "strange-making" – could contribute to systemic policy and institutional change. This includes broader propositions on what can (or even ought to) be designed; aspects of stakeholder design; and opportunities for further research.

Introduction

Public sector reform is a complex process and it cannot be addressed without engaging with the broader socio-political context and the particularities of the specific governance system. However, the tendency is to deal with mere symptoms and to seek short-term improvements, while working in over-legalistic and bureaucratized frameworks (as seen in the rigid format for programing, budgeting, and M&E). In addition, implementing organizations (usually consulting companies) are not willing to take on risks and go an extra mile to make project more effective and meaningful for the "beneficiaries" (i.e. stakeholders). Overall, there is rarely any actor in development that is willing and/or able to genuinely embrace ambiguousness, diverging messiness, as well as "throwness" and the "liquid state" (Boland and Collopy, 2004) necessary for effective design.

The challenges are even higher when projects focus on policy and governance change. Most often, there is little enthusiasm about such projects but they still get funded because of the need to create an impression that "something is being done". When they fail – as they tend to – the usual conclusion is that there was lack of "political will" and/or that change anyway takes very long time. Some projects enter a spiral where the first phase is followed by the second phase, followed by the third phase, etc. – which then leads to continued funding of the very same mechanisms and methods that proved to be ineffective in the first phase. Such an approach merely enables the "shifting the burden" pattern and put focus being on most superficial "entry points" (Meadows, 1999) of system change. Surprisingly, the concepts of "wicked problems" and problematique are still not sufficiently understood, despite the ubiquity of complexity in governance. The failures of such projects can be observed in the whole cycle – from their design and programing, to implementation, to evaluation – creating a vicious circle that is rarely recognized as the main barrier for successful development policy.

Nevertheless, there might be some emerging light at the end of the tunnel. These are still pioneering attempts, but some lessons learned can already be drawn, along with certain theoretical generalization. It should be noted that this proposition is, however, not related to

what is being promoted as "design-thinking" (in terms of creative problem solving in downstream aspects of policy) or the attempts to extend 1.0/2.0 Design to systemic design.

The case study refers to the European Union funded project in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Development of Central Bodies of Governments/Council of Ministers", Feb 2013 – April 2015). It represented the second phase of the so-called Blueprint for Central Bodies developed earlier by OECD/EU Sigma experts. The initial expectation of the project was very low, not least because such projects usually fail – and BiH is particularly difficult country context due to, amongst other, its ethno-political fragmentation and the legacy of the civil war. The project succeeded in accomplishing all expected results (and several other not originally envisaged), primarily due to the incorporation of design attitude and competences.

Relating design and policy

The same way we cannot design experiences (but design *for* them), the issue remains open whether or not we can actually design policies. This depends on what we understand by policy and what we understand by design. If policies are properly understood to include more than mere policy instruments and strategies, then design of policies would imply designing for value configurations (Ozbekhan, 1968) and for addressing the question of "why". Whether or not this is indeed possible is still to be explored, but this does imply that what often goes under policy design is most probably neither policy, nor, in most cases, all what design should represent in terms of attitudes and competences (if not also methods and processes).

Putting the issue of policy design aside for further research, we first need to try to better understand how design relates to policy in more general terms. For that purpose, the analysis of the use of design for a complex system change dealing with governance and institutional systems in this particular EU project provides critical insights.

The main aspect of the relationship between design and policy that should be addressed is the one of practices and cultures. Most often the emphasis is put on how optimized, standardized processes of design and of policy should be superimposed one upon the other. This emphasis suffers from a number of problems, one of which is that such optimized processes rarely reflect the reality of design and of policy. Furthermore, this often redirects the attention from actual practices and from cultural norms and patterns – which are indeed aspects that generate most friction when the community of designers and communities of policy professionals are attempting to work together. Design community is not homogenous and the aspects of systemic approach (or even those dealing with social complexity) might not still be recognized as being at the core of design. As for the public sector, there are also several communities - as we can differentiate between policy makers, public managers, and public servants, amongst several other. Each of those communities has their own practices (over time developed into "professions" or professional "disciplines"), and they developed their own jargons, mental models and ways to understand, interpret and communicate the real-life phenomena. Thus, when a designer and senior government official engage with each other, they might not be "speaking the same language" - let alone have the same understanding of key concepts of their collaborative work. In the case of prolonged misunderstanding and even a conflict, the designer would consider the government official to be not creative, bureaucratic, rigid ("thinking inside the box"), while the government official would consider the designer naïve, amateurish, and pretentious.

While those stereotypes are not without some rationale, the actual problem relates to the meaning that is "lost in translation". For instance, when one side refers to a policy brief it might not be far away (although not identical) to a design brief; and when one side refers to policy options, the other side might not fully realize that the problem is not that design options are so very different from policy options, but that policy options sometimes fail to reach the stage of sufficient divergence (or long-tail foresight) to be able to accommodate novel ideas.

That policy and design are not as different as we might think can be seen through persons who managed to speak both languages with success. Beside Herbert Simon who was pioneering new frameworks in both domains, one of the best illustrations is the case of Rittel and Webber. Their concept of wicked problems was appropriated as much by designers as it was by policy people – without realizing that the authors were representing (at the same time) design, (urban) policy, and systemic approach to planning. Other people were able to cross narrow disciplinary boundaries even more comprehensive, as it can be seen in the work of Russ Ackoff on interactive design applied to democracy (Ackoff and Rovin, 2003).

Design in public sector

Most of those promoting the trend of introducing design to public sector (and hence dealing with public policy and governance) assume that public officials are actually not designing in the first place – so they need a "professional" designer to come in and help apply design "methods" and "thinking". Whether of not government people "design" is a matter of how we define design. However, it should be posited that design in public sector should not be limited to downstream aspects of policy – as currently being addressed by the so-called human-centered design, or with respect to design of policy instruments (Howlett, 2011). Moreover, we would need to properly understand that most of the concepts applied in governance are highly complex and interwoven, which is not reflecting in the "commonsensical" approach often applied by designers. For instance, for a laymen policy and institutions might be two different things, while they actually represent "two sides of the same coin" (i.e. there cannot be an institution without a corresponding policy, and all policies are embedded in institutions).

The approach of this analysis is based on the understanding that "everyone designs". Either based on Simon's definition ("human endeavor of converting actual situations into proffered ones") or on the basis of the proposition that design is a particular tradition of human inquiry (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014) – the concept of design is here related to a basic human potential to create "that-which-does-not-exist". The same way all people are scientists and artists (but not all are professionals), the proposition is that all people are also designers (but not all are professional). Furthermore, design as a discipline has undergone a cultural change from the emphasis on "omnipotent" individual designer to professional co-design teams to stakeholder design. This analysis is based on the last trend, with design being done by stakeholders themselves, and the role of design professional limited to that of facilitator and coach.

The other question is what can be designed in public sector anyway - and the answer is quite long a list. Traditionally, design was used for built environment and infrastructure; visual identity, communications and campaigns; interior design; and product design. More recently, design moved into public services (including interfaces) and for application of digital technologies. For a very long time, various approaches to design were used for procedures,

processes, project and programs, and organizational change. Design was not alien even when policy instruments (regulations, investment project, etc.) were created; and it has been a part of development of educational curricula. There is also a certain tradition with institutional and community design - in particular in Scandinavian countries regarding aspects of democracy and with grass-root movements. And there is a valid proposition that policies, values, and cultures can be treated through design, as well.

Key concepts

Without going too wide with regard to the definition of design, it will suffice to refer to the definition by Nelson and Stolterman (2014) which considers design to be the ability to imagine that-which-does-not-exist and to make it appear in concrete form as a new purposeful addition to the real world. There are various approaches to policy (Peters, 2015; Moran et al, 2006), but it will be sufficient to frame it in terms of systemic intervention into society for "betterment" and based on (re)configuration of values (Ozbekhan, 1968). One of the main concepts referred to in this paper is Alexander's "generating systems" (1968), which are systems (kits of parts) that provide frameworks for particular systems are to be designed.

More specifically to the case study, there are several concepts that are worth clarifying a bit. Although always contextual (i.e. definitions varying from country to country) the difference between public sector and public administration could be summarized in terms of the former focusing on delivery of public services (e.g. education or health), while the later relates to the "machinery" of government (e.g. ministries and agencies). Within public administration there is a particular assemblage of structures called "Center of Government" (CoG), which includes all central bodies of government that perform, primarily, the functions of prioritization and inter-institutional coordination. This is where offices of Prime ministers (or Presidents) are located, as well as where central regulatory secretariats, general secretariats, and central policy units operate. Properly understood, CoG also includes line ministries performing coordination of certain functions distributed across other ministries (e.g. ministries of finance, of public administration or public services, and sometimes also ministries of justice).

It should be noted that the approach to design in this paper does not relate to some standard process of design (or to specific design methods), but to practices and culture of design. This is known as design attitude (Boland and Collopy, 2004) and design competence (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014). Hence, the analysis of the case study will focus on manifestation of design as observed through processes, practices, attitudes, culture, and relationships – with process and methods presented in the background.

Case study

In a sense, the case study can be characterized as "stakeholder design of generating systems for policy". It refers to the project funded by the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on "Development of Central Bodies of Government / Council of Ministers" (Rava, 2013). The notion of "central bodies" is a local variation of CoG (Center of Government, as previously explained), while the title includes the plural of governments. The project covered four different administrative systems: the central-level Council of Ministers, the Government of the Republic of Srpska, the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Government of the District of Brcko. Even the mere explanation of the title indicates the high level of complexity of governance in BiH. This is a country that cannot be clearly classified as

either federation of confederation, and that consists of two very diverse entities (one centralized republic and another one a loose federation of 10 cantons) organized along ethnic lines creating during the war in early 1990s (in addition to the District of Brcko). It is comprised of a total of 14 "main" governments and corresponding legislatures (not counting the local level, i.e. municipal governments) with overlapping mandates and unclear functional boundaries. With all that for a population of less than 4 million, BiH represents a country in which public administration reform rarely provides effective and systemic results. By achieving all expected results (and a bit more) the project presented in this paper was clearly an outlier. The main reason for that being the mainstreaming of design attitudes and competences, along with the emphasis on stakeholder design.

The project was dealing with design of two specific systems – both of which sub-systems of policy design. One was the system for strategic planning, and the other was the broader system for policy making with the focus on Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). These 2 (sub)systems were to be redesigned in four main governments (central level, two entities, and Brcko), which lead to the need to work on 8 tracks at the same time. Originally, the project was expected to follow a typical, linear process of conducting research and comparative analysis, preparing methodologies and new regulations, and organizing training for implementation. The design was already assumed to have existed before the project launch (at least with regard to "why" and "what"), with the purpose of the project to operationalize it through design of new policy instruments (addressing the "how"). The total duration was just above 2 years, with a relatively small budget and only 1 Key Expert (with limited involvement of short-term experts).

The analysis of the case study led to consolidation of four "bundles" of design practices in this project, as presented below. Each of those briefly indicates what happened in the project and then relates this to elements of design attitude or competences.

Challenging the brief by redesign for upstream focus and stakeholder design.

The first aspect of design in this project was the change of project design itself, including the original strategy represented in the design brief (Terms of Reference). It addressed the issues of "why" and "who", in additional to a new "what", starting from the position that all original assumptions should be revisited and challenged. The exercise specifically used for this was to conducting a Gap Assessment, focusing on identification of design needs by comparing the expected design with current situation. Not only that this task was not planned in the project, but it ended up lasting for several months (of the overall 2 years of project duration), with corresponding investment of expert time and a delay in expected project implementation. Moreover, the assessment was not done in the conventional expert-led manner, but through a collaborative process in which stakeholders were engaged in shared learning. This implied considerable risk for the project, but was considered to represent the best approach to bring about effective results and eventually tuning the whole endeavor into potentially sucesful project. One of the enabling factors was the low level of expectations from the project: given that such projects usually fail, there was certain inclination to allow experimenting with innovative frameworks. Thus, it was relatively safe for the project to be "playful" because it was expected to fail anyway. Hence, the only actual risk was considered to relate to the reputation of the Key Expert, and the consulting company implementing the project – both of which committed to take the risk in order to try to make a difference.

In addition to its analytical purpose, the Gap Assessment helped introduce new frames of reference and co-create new ideas about the final design of strategic planning and RIA systems (i.e. it was conducted in an interactive design manner). The stakeholders co-created (initially "through" the expert as facilitator, but increasingly in direct engagement with each other) a new "desiderata" (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014). The objectives of the project and the final design remained the same, but the intention (the aim) changed drastically – as did the idealized design. To illustrate this, it suffices to explain that the original intention was to redesign formal structures of central bodies towards a list of standard functions (as codified in the Blueprint) and formalized them in new regulation - while the new intention was to address the change of practices, processes, procedures, skills, and attitudes, without necessarily requiring major reorganization.

The Gap Assessment was a convenient entry for moving away from linear, downstream, expert delivery of project outputs based on problem solving, and towards upstream, iterative, stakeholder-led systemic design. Furthermore, this first step in the project helped to broaden the boundary of what a stakeholder represented: from initial 4 institutions the design now involved more than 20 institutions and project. Finally, from isolated design of 8 different systems (2 for each government), the project strategy was now to work on all 8 tracks at the same time, while attempting to achieve their functional (strategic planning with RIA) and administrative (across governments) harmonization and integration.

Throwness. "Liquid state". Reflecting in/with/on/across situations.

Some of the key elements of design attitude and competences in this project can be observed in the process of the developing new methodologies and corresponding legal acts for new systems for strategic planning and RIA in the 4 main BiH governments.

The first and probably the most important relates to the concept of "throwness" (Boland, and Collopy, 2004). The design process does not (and cannot) start with a blank canvas – all design challenges are embedded in a particular context and they have a "history" (with related path-dependencies and underlying patterns). Moreover, attempting to disregard the context and start from a scratch prevents using existing capacity and existing designs. Anyway, as Latour argued: all design is redesign.

This particular project assumed that almost all elements of new design artifacts already exist, but are not configured in the way that properly approximates the new idealized design. In practical terms, this meant that the new design did not try to "invent" new instruments, but used existing ones in a new configuration. For instance, in the case of policy design and RIA, all governments already developed the so-called "thesis" (policy brief). The new design worked on transforming the "thesis" into effective policy design instrument. Hence, the project engaged in "reorient" actors towards new aims in the situation in which they "thrown" into – so as to chart new maps for the existing territory. Finally, the project did not apply what is usually referred to as "empathy" in design because there was nobody to be emphatic. There was no an external design team that would need to "understand" somebody: it was stakeholders who designed with their own understanding and frames of reference.

Another key design concept (originally from Frank Gehry – see in Boland, and Collopy, 2004) is that of "liquid state". This is a prolonged state of ambiguisness during iterative cycles of divergence, emergence and convergence. The intention here is to prevent premature closure,

i.e. leaving the design open for as long as possible. Most designers feel comfortable in this state of "agony", but it is a rather alien state of being for government officials.

The project introduced a major change of underlying cultural patterns by preventing any sort of a "draft" methodology for new systems for a relatively long period. There were certain iterations of artefacts during workshops and dialogues, and there was a lot of probing, but the first prototype emerged only after several months (and even that one was considered to be merely a "Schreck prototype"). This "agony" was accompanied by intensive process of learning, combinations of strange- and sense-making methods; interactive dwelling "outside" and "inside" the "box"; and making a large number of "design judgments" (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014). This first phase of design continued into a more "crystalline" design process for another 6 months producing a series of increasingly high-fidelity design outputs. It finished only when the stakeholders considered it "good enough", which is when the "actual design problem" was solved only after another major redesign of all systems (see below).

The project was deeply involved in working across several complex systems and in an interactive manner. There was no hierarchy or a standard pattern of which system (or aspect of the system) goes first. There was reflection with and in and on and across design situations. The cross-fertilization and peer-learning of working across 20 stakeholders in 4 governments kept intensifying until the very end. Overall, there were more than 30 workshops, coaching events, dialogues and consultations in less than a year. Of particular importance were "friendly chats" for informal sharing; for addressing frustration (not least due to the continuous "agony" public officials were exposed to); and for helping avoid tendency of diverse stakeholders to "argue in confusion".

Design into "making". Letting go. The "living" design.

As design of all systems was coming to the end, one intervention led to everything being redone from the beginning just 6 months before the project's end. In a way, the design brief changed fundamentally at that moment – the moment that would not have happened had the design did not extent into actual "making". Namely, most design processes stop before the "making" phase (which is different from prototyping). This is a legacy of product design where manufacturing was separate from the design. However, in governance (and in most systemic design processes), design has to extend into "making", i.e. it is only when the final design is actually produced (and then actually used) that we can have the final closure. Indeed, it is in the early implementation that main design deficiencies are becoming more obvious – and this cannot be prevented even with high fidelity prototypes and testing, when design is about evasive policy or governance change.

What happened in the project was that one stakeholder realized that the new system for strategic planning would not work well without it being integrated with the systems for annual and multi-annual budgeting, for investment planning, and for planning human resources. It was a lone voice, but worth listening to - and eventually it led to an agreement to redesign everything once more. The complexity, which was high anyway, increased drastically by introducing 3 new complex systems (some of which themselves only then being designed in other projects). Furthermore, the time for redesign was absurdly short: after 12 months of the original design process, all needed to be redesigned in mere 2 months (and that included working with all 4 governments for redesigning 8 different frameworks). The result was exceptional: the added value of redesign made it not only more effective in implementation, but fundamentally changed the perception of government officials of what is feasible if proper

design approach is applied. Deciding to engage in this last-minute design was probably the most difficult and risky design judgment in the whole project. The trust developed amongst the stakeholders in their own new abilities was the main factor to venture in that direction.

By the very definition, there are no "solutions" to complex, wicked problems. The design continues to morph in the implementation and the only stopping rule is deciding when the design output is satisficing – and the committing to engage in further redesign in the next stage. This is the moment of second "letting go" (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014). Indeed, the design of the new systems was "out of the studio": when it started to be implemented it started to take a life of its own. Amongst other, it was embraced by the political level as one of the main pillars for broader European integration process – an aspect that had not been envisaged in the course of the project, but that fully aligns with the design desiderata.

The project also embraced the understanding that design artifacts should not be "finished" or "overdone". There should still be certain "flaws" in the design that would make it less than ideal – and these aspects that would then be left for further change in the course of implementation. This would enable the design to continue changing in practice – and indeed the project outputs are still being improved 2 years after the project ended. There was massive training for the use of new systems (beyond the scope of the stakeholder design team, i.e. for line-ministries), but there was no usual "exit" strategy that such projects often require. There was nothing to be "transferred" to the "beneficiaries" with stakeholders having become experts in new systems in the course of their involvement in the design of those. The design has been "owned" by them from the very start – no vacuum was created when the project expert left.

Finally, it is worth noting that systemic design cannot be scaled as usually considered (i.e. replicated for new users or communities). What can be scaled are the principles underlying the design – as it indeed happened. Namely, the design outputs developed for the 4 main governments in BiH were later modified, redesigned, and applied at the level of cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Beyond co-design: towards stakeholder design. Responsibility for design outcomes.

The first realization about stakeholder design is that the design "material" is us (i.e. stakeholders). It is the stakeholders that undergo a learning process (which is then the key design aim) that produces design content and artifacts (i.e. design objectives and outputs). Stakeholder design understood along those lines is then very different from co-design by professional designer teams with occasional involvement of users / "beneficiaries". It is not expert driven and solutions are not coming from the outside of the community of future users. The role of design professional is to act as facilitator, broker, guide, and coach dealing with structured processes and introducing methods of design – while leaving the content of design to be generated and given form by the stakeholders.

In that context, the occasional frustration of designers that "beneficiaries" (or clients) "do not understand our design" becomes meaningless – the design is anyway "their". It is the stakeholders who create the meaning of design artifacts, including the specific aesthetics of it (another point of frustration for professional, in particular graphical, designers). Moreover, such approach cannot be divided into design and implementation because the design process itself builds the capacity for implementation, and implementation provided feedback for the design (none of which can be dealt with by prototyping in these contexts). It is design as a

learning process that empowers stakeholders, who that end up "knowing it better" than anyone else, including the professional designer being involved as facilitator.

Professional designers are still needed, but their role is drastically different. Designers always need to develop understanding of culture and to develop trust, but in the case of stakeholder design this gets to a whole new level. There are two anecdotes to illustrate this. One of the stakeholders was a stereotypical government official. His preference was to talk for long (often 3 or more hours) about various issues that had nothing directly to do with the project. After this prolonged process, it would take less than half an hour to address the key issues of the project. And these highly efficient half an hour were worth more than a whole workshop in terms of the contribution to design results. Whether he was doing that intentionally or it was merely his personal style, this person became the leader of reforms and one of three individuals who led to transformative results of the project. Understanding the specific dynamics of engagement with this person was one of the most crucial factors for project's success.

The second anecdote refers to building trust and the issue of responsibility for design outcomes. While working with another stakeholder, the initial reaction from his side was highly negative: he did not consider that there is no need for redesign of the systems already in place, and he did not trust experts anyway. A gathering was organized with stakeholders from that particular government and the question emerged: why do we need all those people to be involved? This reflected the usual approach when one institution is assigned to propose the final solutions. The designer proposed an "contract": all will work together until the very end, but if they do not find the final document satisfactory, they can "tear it up and throw it into the trash bin". The ability to withdraw from the process even at the very end facilitated creating a high level of trust, but it also generated a strong commitment to shared design artifact. The result being that final document was accepted without almost any changes.

The professional designer's role in this project was well beyond the formal consulting obligations to the client. Actually, some of the tasks performed in the project to ensure quality design results could be seen as a breach of the official contract with the client. It could have been quite normal for the Key Expert to resort to conventional project implementation to limit his responsibility for the design outcome. Instead, the approach was similar to what is known as "guarantor of design" (Nelson and Stolterman, 2014). Once engaged, the professional designer was fully embedded in the process and the context, and he assumed all risks of final outcomes. For that purpose, such a designer has to develop the ability to create high levels of trust and mutual understanding; to constantly nurture an enabling environment for collaborative learning while still challenging assumptions and mental models; and to constantly negotiate the design brief and the expectations by balancing between adaptability to emerging circumstances and consistency of the design strategy (see also in Jones, 1992).

In conclusion

Applying design in government and for policy ought to be organized as a learning process. This is not only because it should be based on stakeholder design, but also because policy for complex problems is itself a process of learning. Few policies deal with structured (simple) problems that can be addressed by a rule-based solution, and some policies deal with semi-structured (complicated) problems that can be addressed through politics (bargaining over means and/or accommodation of ends). Nevertheless, most policies deal with complex problem and those problems can be addressed only through a learning process – the design

being the most adequate framework for that, provided it is itself based on collaborative learning design process.

In addition to being related to several aspects of design attitude and competence, this project also represents a good example of what the actual design problem is. It is often considered that design problem is about moving from a problem to a solution. Instead, Nelson and Stolterman (2014) posit that the design problem is the perceived difference between the ideal design (particular "ideal" - parti) and the pragmatic, real-world particular "real". Thus, design is about approximation of an idealized solution to final, actual design through cycles of problem-framing and problem-solving. This is exactly what the project ended up with after the idealized "solution" was developed (as aim or desiderata) in the course of Gap Assessment. Moreover, the expectation from how far the approximation should go was set just "one degree above" the existing capacity of stakeholders – thus ensuring that the final design is aligned with their capacity for implementation. This might be another important lesson learn – any design that does not reflect the current capacity for implementation and use would most probably be ineffective.

Most of the analysis of this case study was done retroactively – although most of what happened in the project was intentional, the conceptualization as project activities as design tasks was done 2 years after the end of the project. Most stakeholders in this project were not even aware that the processed they were part of were design processes. There were no standard design protocol or a toolkit of "methods" (even less of what often goes as "design thinking") in this project. And only by retracing the whole trajectory and then translating aspects of it in terms of design concepts made it possible to present and explain this project it in terms of design. That raises important issues: How many of similar projects and change initiatives apply design without being fully aware of it? How many government officials are "designing" without knowing it? And why this is important anyway?

I would argue that it is indeed very important to be conscious of design for, at least, three reasons. The first one is that it provides opportunities to improve one's practice and grow as a designer (not least in terms of design values, attitudes and competences). The second one is that we still do not have effective policy design methodologies, so capturing and consolidating real-life practices in terms of design concept would enable comparative research - that would then inform policy design methodologies. The final reason is that it would help mitigate conflicts between design community and community of policy and governance people; prevent losing "meaning in translation" and "arguing in confusion"; and lead to continuous development of shared new practices and concepts of policy design.

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