At the undergraduate level, I remain something of a generalist and have enjoyed teaching many of the undergraduate philosophy courses at Ryerson. At the graduate level, I specialize in moral agency and social and political philosophy. My current research concerns several lines of criticisms against procedural liberalism as developed by Kant and Rawls. According to its critics, Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism presupposes something of a metaphysical or a moral embarrassment when it comes to moral agency, it harbors sectarian threats in its practical implications and it conflicts with the politics of recognition. By appeal to exemplifications of the moral reasoning of Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism and Christine Korsgaard’s account of the formal moral reasoning of Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism, I argue that the critical reconstructions are off-track. My overriding interest is in the role of formal moral reasoning in procedural justice for a political morality. I am happy to work on any figures related to these sets of issues.
(2013) "Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and the Canadian Moral Identity," in Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues, (ed.) Lorraine Mayer and Sandra Tomsons, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press).
(2011) “Social Injustice and the Problem of Cross-Purposes,” Journal of Social Philosophy, XLII: 153-172.
(2001) "Philosophy and Interracial Dialogue," The Philosophical Forum, XXXII: 107-124.
(1999) "Liberalism, Culture, and Aboriginal Rights: In Defence of Kymlicka," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29: 109-138.
(1995) "Is Davidson's Theory of Action Consistent?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 317-334.
VIDEO FROM RYERSON’S 8TH ANNUAL PHILOSOPHY SYMPOSIUM (MAY 15TH, 2015).